souvik101990 wrote:
No one who lacks knowledge of a subject is competent to pass judgment on that subject. Since political know-how is a matter, not of adhering to technical rules, but of insight and style learned through apprenticeship and experience, only seasoned politicians are competent to judge whether a particular political policy is fair to all.
A major weakness of the argument is that it
(A) relies on a generalization about the characteristic that makes someone competent to pass judgment
(B) fails to give specific examples to illustrate how political know-how can be acquired
(C) uses the term "apprenticeship" to describe what is seldom a formalized relationship
(D) equates political know-how with understanding the social implications of political policies
(E) assumes that when inexperienced politicians set policy they are guided by the advice of more experienced politicians
Posting the official answer for anyone who needs itOnly veteran politicians are competent to judge whether a policy is fair, says the author, because competence in passing judgment on a subject requires knowledge of that subject, and only veteran politicians have political know-how. But is political know-how the same “subject” as policy fairness? Is political know- how the field of knowledge that deals with the social implications of legislation? The author seems to think so, but must he be right? That’s the criticism that (D) makes: It’s not obvious that political know-how is the same thing as understanding the social implications of policy, but the argument treats it as such.
(A) attacks the first statement, which is a premise, but the generalization that unknowledgeable people aren’t competent to pass judgment is a very reasonable claim.
(B) Specific examples of how political know-how is acquired aren’t necessary. Few of us would dispute the author’s claim that it’s acquired by watching, and working with, those who have it.
(C) isn’t a weakness; the author simply uses “apprenticeship” metaphorically to imply that politicians learn the ropes from experienced politicians who already possess “know-how.”
(E) isn’t something that the author must be assuming, since the argument concerns who is competent to judge policy, not who actually does so and how.