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## Islam and the Revolt of the Petit Bourgeoisie

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
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recent Iranian revolution; and against hidebound conservative clerics, *ulama'-yi qisbri*, as Dr. Ali Shariati was fond of saying in Iran in the 1970s, who teach a *din-i kbosbk*, a dry, lifeless religion)

- (4) A cynical tool of elites' foreign policy as well as domestic efforts to mobilize symbols of legitimacy, or
- (5) An irrationalist force<sup>5</sup> against which vigilance must be vigorous

Intellectuals tend to paint a progressive picture of the generational dialectic. Beginning in the nineteenth century (with roots in the eighteenth<sup>6</sup>), a puritanical religious reformism (or premodern fundamentalism) focused on four themes: (1) purifying Islam of centuries of superstitious accretions; (2) insisting on a free use of *ijtihad* (a disciplined form of reasoning to provide religious answers to new problems); (3) primacy of sociomoral issues over eschatological-metaphysical ones; and (4) political militancy, manifestations of which were the rise of the Wahhabis in Arabia, the Sanusi in Cyrenaica, the Fulani in Nigeria, the Mahdi in the Sudan, and the victory of the Usuli *mujtabeds* in Shiite Iran and Iraq.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, modernist reformism followed, which stressed the compatibility of Islam with modern scientific technology and democratic constitutional government. The key experiments were the constitutional reforms in Turkey, Iran, and Egypt.<sup>7</sup> Jalaluddin al-Afghani (1838-97) stressed educational reform, constitutionalism, pan-Islamic cohesion (bridging sectarian differences), and mobilizing the masses against imperialism through popular Islamic rhetoric, if necessary. Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) also emphasized the need for Muslim solidarity and the renewal of Islam through Western learning. Although Abduh thought a benevolent despot for a decade or two might be necessary, he provided modernists with democratic interpretations of old Islamic terms in the hope of providing a bulwark against secularism: *maslaha* (reform for the good of the Islamic community) became utilitarianism; *shura* (consultation) became parliamentary democracy; and *'ijma* (consensus of the learned) became public opinion.<sup>8</sup> The rise of a critical literary movement gave support to modernist reform: the *an-nabda al-adabiyya* (literary renaissance) in the Arab world; the creation of modern poetic and prose styles by "enlightened" (*rosban-fekr*) Persians; and the gradual expansion, from urban elites to intellectuals with rural backgrounds, of Turkish social issue-oriented short story, novel, and poetry writing.<sup>9</sup>

The generation of the thirties saw a peak in secularist, Westernizing, constitutionalist faith. Intellectuals like Taha Husain, Tawfiq al-Hakim, Naqib Mahfuz, Ahmad Kasravi, and Sadeq Hedayat, as well as politicians such as Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Reza Shah, could speak openly of Islam as a backward-keeping force. Ataturk's reforms in the twenties and thirties became models both of secularization and of attempts to guide Muslims to use reason rather than tradition in approaching their religion. Religious affairs, including schools to train prayer leaders and preachers, were placed under state control; traditional *madradas* closed, and the old ministries of the *sharia* and the religious endowments abolished, as was the caliphate; Sufi orders were banned, the fez and the veil prohibited, and the wearing of ecclesiastical garb limited to