trader1 wrote:
R.E.D. wrote:
This weekend heard an interesting figure from one of the Russian bankers: amount to be lost due to the financial crisis is about 130 billion dollars. Total profit in the last year in all the US banking sector was about 400 billion dollars. The important thing is who will take the losses...
In continue, a 10-min video telling the truth about financial crisis:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJ_qK4g6ntMNo worries?!
https://www.reuters.com/article/ousiv/id ... 5120080308Banks face "systemic margin call," $325 billion hit: JPM
Sat Mar 8, 2008 9:23am EST
By Walden Siew
NEW YORK (Reuters) - Wall Street banks are facing a "systemic margin call" that may deplete banks of $325 billion of capital due to deteriorating subprime U.S. mortgages, JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM.N: Quote, Profile, Research), said in a report late on Friday.
JPMorgan, which sent a default notice to Thornburg Mortgage Inc. (TMA.N: Quote, Profile, Research) after the lender missed a $28 million margin call, said more default notices and margin calls were likely. The Carlyle Group's mortgage fund also failed to meet $37 million in margin calls this week.
"A systemic credit crunch is underway, driven primarily by bank writedowns for subprime mortgages," according to the report co-authored by analyst Christopher Flanagan. "We would characterize this situation as a systemic margin call."
The credit crisis that began about a year ago will likely intensify after Friday's weak February U.S. employment report "that most definitely signals recession," JPMorgan said.
Indeed, corporate bond spreads widened to a new record on Friday, surpassing levels seen in October 2002 during a boom in bankruptcies following the dot-com crash. U.S. employers cut payrolls in February for a second consecutive month, slashing 63,000 jobs, the biggest monthly job decline in nearly five years, the U.S. Labor Department reported on Friday.
"The weak February employment report points to an economy in recession," JPMorgan said.
The JPMorgan report included a revised bleaker forecast for subprime-related home prices. The bank now sees prices falling 30 percent, from its prior 25 percent forecast. Those prices have declined 14 percent since mid-2006, JPMorgan said.
I would say that it's a painful, but regular flow of economic cycles. You can't get higher without stepping back a bit. Russia had something similar within national scale in 2004. It lead to a re-distribution of market shares of banks and nationalization of one of the banks. And the current US banking crisis is going to influence more European countries than US.
Within long term things are going to return back on track. Exactly at the time of our graduation
https://www.economist.com/finance/econom ... d=10496807 A DASH of otherworldliness is part of the charm of academic conferences. But this year's annual meeting of the American Economic Association (AEA) in New Orleans afforded little shelter. Reality gatecrashed the very first morning of the three-day meeting, the world's largest convention of dismal scientists, with the release of a report on January 4th showing that America's unemployment rate had spiked from 4.7% to 5% in December. The bad news made a presentation by Kenneth Rogoff, a professor at Harvard University, on the final day all the more timely. His paper*, written with Carmen Reinhart of the University of Maryland and part of a larger historical study, sets out some parallels between America's subprime mess and 18 previous banking crises in the rich world. For an audience recovering from a Saturday night on Bourbon Street, the conclusions were aptly sobering.
The authors show that, although details may vary, banking crises follow the same broad script. Each blow-up is preceded by rising home and equity prices; an acceleration in capital inflows driven by optimistic foreign investors; a rapid build-up of debt; and—immediately before the storm hits—an inverted V-shaped path for the economy, with growth first picking up and then faltering. The years just before the start of the subprime meltdown fit the Reinhart-Rogoff template remarkably well. Indeed on most criteria, the portents of trouble were more marked than in past crises. House prices rose more sharply in real terms. Equity-market gains were more persistent. Capital inflows picked up too, though they were already running at an alarmingly high level. America's current-account deficit was much larger, relative to GDP, than in a typical crisis candidate.
Given such ominous indications, what of the aftermath? Mr Rogoff was careful to say that the malign effects of the subprime mess might not be as great as those of previous crises. A great deal of uncertainty remains, not least about the scale of lending losses. Yet the precedents are worrying. In the 18 earlier crises, the average drop in output growth was two percentage points and it took two years for growth to return to normal. For the five worst crises, growth rates tumbled by five percentage points from their peak and recovery took more than three years. If America avoids a material slowdown, say the authors, “it should either be considered very lucky or even more ‘special' than most optimistic theories suggest.”
Financial-market lore has it that uttering “this time is different” is the easiest way to get laughed off a trading floor. When recession beckons, the statement invites still more ridicule. At the AEA conference, it fell to Alan Taylor of the University of California to make the case (in the spirit of debate as much as from heartfelt advocacy) that things might not turn out quite as badly as the Reinhart-Rogoff analysis suggests.
A crucial factor is the cost of the final bill. The average rich-world banking crisis in the Reinhart-Rogoff sample leads to recession. But this result is driven by the “big five” blow-ups (among them the implosion of Japan's banking system in the 1990s). Mr Taylor notes that the other 13 had little discernible effect on the wider economy. If all of America's subprime borrowers defaulted and only half of the $1.3 trillion lent to them was recovered, the losses of $650 billion would amount to around 5% of GDP—on a par with the smallest of the big five crises. If losses turned out to be lower, as most estimates suggest, America would probably get off lightly.