Ronald Dworkin argues that judges are in danger of uncritically embrac

Question

Ronald Dworkin argues that judges are in danger of
uncritically embracing an erroneous theory known as
legal positivism because they think that the only alternative
is a theory that they (and Dworkin) see as clearly
  (5)   unacceptable—natural law. The latter theory holds that
judges ought to interpret the law by consulting their
own moral convictions, even if this means ignoring the
letter of the law and the legal precedents for its
interpretation. Dworkin regards this as an
  (10)   impermissible form of judicial activism that arrogates
to judges powers properly reserved for legislators.

Legal positivism, the more popular of the two
theories, holds that law and morality are wholly
distinct. The meaning of the law rests on social
  (15)   convention in the same way as does the meaning of a
word. Dworkin’s view is that legal positivists regard
disagreement among jurists as legitimate only if it
arises over what the underlying convention is, and it is
to be resolved by registering a consensus, not by
  (20)   deciding what is morally right. In the same way,
disagreement about the meaning of a word is settled by
determining how people actually use it, and not by
deciding what it ought to mean. Where there is no
consensus, there is no legal fact of the matter. The
  (25)   judge’s interpretive role is limited to discerning this
consensus, or the absence thereof.

According to Dworkin, this account is
incompatible with the actual practice of judges and
lawyers, who act as if there is a fact of the matter even
  (30)   in cases where there is no consensus. The theory he
proposes seeks to validate this practice without falling
into what Dworkin correctly sees as the error of natural
law theory. It represents a kind of middle ground
between the latter and legal positivism. Dworkin
  (35)   stresses the fact that there is an internal logic to a
society’s laws and the general principles they typically
embody. An interpretation that conforms to these
principles may be correct even if it is not supported by
a consensus. Since these general principles may
  (40)   involve such moral concepts as justice and fairness,
judges may be called upon to consult their own moral
intuitions in arriving at an interpretation. But this is not
to say that judges are free to impose their own morality
at will, without regard to the internal logic of the laws.
  (45)   The positivist’s mistake, as Dworkin points out, is
assuming that the meaning of the law can only consist
in what people think it means, whether these people be
the original authors of the law or a majority of the
interpreter’s peers. Once we realize, as Dworkin does,
  (50)   that the law has an internal logic of its own that
constrains interpretation, we open up the possibility of
improving upon the interpretations not only of our
contemporaries but of the original authors.    1 
 1. Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?

(A) Dworkin regards natural law theory as a middle ground between legal positivism and judicial activism.
(B) Dworkin holds that judicial interpretations should not be based solely on identifying a consensus or solely on moral intuition, but should be consistent with the reasoning that underlies the law.
(C) Dworkin argues that the internal logic of the law should generally guide judges except in instances where consensus is registered or judges have strong moral intuitions.
(D) Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretation is based on borrowing equally from natural law theory and legal positivism.
(E) Dworkin validates judges’ dependence on moral intuition, reason, and the intent of the authors of a law, but only in cases where a social consensus is not present.

2 
 2. What is the main purpose of the second paragraph?

(A) to explain why legal positivism is so popular
(B) to evaluate the theory of legal positivism
(C) to discuss how judicial consensus is determined
(D) to identify the basic tenets of legal positivism
(E) to argue in favor of the theory of legal positivism

3 
 3. Which one of the following most accurately characterizes the author’s attitude toward Dworkin’s theory?

(A) confident endorsement of its central assertions
(B) caution about its potential for justifying some forms of judicial activism
(C) modest expectation that some of its claims will be found to be unwarranted
(D) quiet conviction that its importance derives only from its originality
(E) enthusiasm that it will replace legal positivism as the most popular theory of legal interpretation

4 
 4. According to the passage, which one of the following is a goal of Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretation?

(A) no evaluate previous legal interpretations by judges influenced by legal positivism
(B) to dispute the notion that social consensus plays any role in legal interpretation
(C) to provide a theoretical argument against the use of moral intuition in legal interpretation
(D) to argue that legal decisions must be based on the principles of the original authors of the laws
(E) to validate theoretically the method commonly used by judges in practice

5 
 5. The passage suggests that Dworkin would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements?

(A) Judges and lawyers too often act as though there is a fact of the matter in legal cases.
(B) Judges should not use their moral intuition when it conflicts with the intentions of those legislators who authored the law being interpreted.
(C) Legal positivism is a more popular theory than natural law theory because legal positivism simplifies the judge’s role.
(D) If there is consensus about how to interpret a law, then jurists should not examine the internal logic of the law being interpreted.
(E) Legal positivists misunderstand the role of moral intuition in legal interpretation.

6 
 6. It can be inferred that legal positivists, as described in the passage, agree with which one of the following statements?

(A) Judges sometimes ought to be allowed to use personal moral convictions as a basis for a legal interpretation.
(B) Disagreements about the meaning of a law are never legitimate.
(C) The ultimate standard of interpretation is the logic of the law itself, not moral intuition.
(D) The meaning of a law derives from jurists’ interpretations of that law.
(E) There is no legal fact of the matter when jurists have differing moral convictions about an issue.

IanStewart · Answer

For Question 4, the answer is explicit in the text:

"According to Dworkin, this account is incompatible with  the actual practice of judges and lawyers , who act as if there is a fact of the matter even (30) in cases where there is no consensus. The theory he proposes seeks to validate  this practice "

So his theory seeks to validate "this practice" (second phrase in red), which refers back "the actual practice of judges and lawyers" (first phrase in red).

For Question 5, which I think is the most difficult in a batch of extremely difficult questions, the answer is supported in the last paragraph, in this part of the text:

"Dworkin (35) stresses the fact that there is an internal logic to a society’s laws and the general principles they typically
embody. An interpretation that conforms to these principles may be correct even if it is not supported by a consensus. Since these general principles may (40) involve such moral concepts as justice and fairness, judges may be called upon to consult their own moral intuitions in arriving at an interpretation.... The positivist’s mistake, as Dworkin points out, is assuming that the meaning of the law can only consist in what people think it means"

which needs a bit of decoding. We learn: Dworkin thinks interpretation "may be correct" if it conforms to the "principles" mentioned in the first sentence. Later, these "principles may involve... moral concepts". And later, he talks about "the positivist's mistake" about this issue, and that mistake lies in believing that legal interpretation relies purely on finding a consensus, rather than in sometimes using internal logic and other general principles, including morality when called for.

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Sajjad1994 · Answer

Explanation

5. The passage suggests that Dworkin would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements?

Explanation

There’s no point in trying to make a prediction about the right answer, but we can predict something about the wrong ones—they will either deviate from the passage’s scope, or reflect natural law or legal positivist ideas.

(A) , for instance, is a view held by legal positivists  (lines 23-24)  and rejected by Dworkin.

(B)  would be fine if it ended  “...if it conflicts with the law’s internal logic,”  but as written does not reflect Dworkin’s ideas at all.

(C)  brings up that popularity issue again; has any one word thrown into an LSAT passage ever generated quite so many wrong answers in the past?

(D)  is a 180 because it has things precisely backward: To Dworkin, internal logic must trump consensus rather than vice versa.  Lines 39-49  support  (E) , which properly credits Dworkin with the idea that the legal positivists are wrong to discount all morality in judicial interpretation. As long as it’s constrained by the logic of the law, morality has a place.

Answer: E

Sajjad1994 · Answer

Explanation

6. It can be inferred that legal positivists, as described in the passage, agree with which one of the following statements?

Explanation

As we might expect, the wrong answers here will either reflect natural law or Dworkin ideas or distort the text or scope.

(A)  is certainly a natural law idea (cf. lines 5-7).

Contrary to  (B), “disagreements”  must be legitimate to the legal positivists because they have a theory about their resolution  (lines 16-20) .

(C)  is a Dworkin idea, plain and simple—his main point, actually.

Correct  choice (D)  is a paraphrase of  lines 45-49  and is supported by  paragraph 2  as well. For the record,

(E)  can be quickly rejected because it gives credence to judges’ moral convictions, even though  (lines 16- 20) , to legal positivists, morality plays no role.

Answer: D

Gaurav2896 · Answer

HI  AndrewN  i tried to grasp what IamStewart,s reasoning I got it but still don't understand why A is wrong.

AndrewN · Answer

There are a few points I would like to make here,  Gaurav2896 . First, this passage is from the LSAT. I am not a huge fan of cross-training with LSAT questions for GMATTM purposes unless you have a qualified tutor or teacher who can handpick passages or questions for you that resemble those on the test you intend to take. In other words, most LSAT material, despite surface similarities, is more trouble than it is worth (in my view). Second, if you are unclear about some point  IanStewart  has made, why not ask  him  for clarification? He is a knowledgeable and friendly Expert, and I am sure he would be happy to offer further views on the matter. Finally, the explanation provided by   Sajjad1994   clearly and concisely explains why (A) is incorrect. With all of these considerations, I would urge you again to pursue another path to understanding this question, or, in fact, to let it go altogether.

- Andrew

Sajjad1994 · Answer

Summary of the Passage:

-Dworkin warns judges against embracing legal positivism uncritically, as they see the alternative of natural law theory as unacceptable judicial activism.

-Legal positivism asserts a complete separation between law and morality, relying on social convention and consensus to determine the meaning of the law.

-Dworkin argues that the positivist account contradicts actual judicial practice and proposes a theory that balances between natural law and legal positivism, emphasizing the internal logic of laws and principles.

-Dworkin emphasizes that interpretations consistent with societal principles, which may include moral concepts, can be correct even without consensus. However, judges must consider the internal logic of laws and not impose their own morality.

-Dworkin points out the positivist's mistake in assuming that the meaning of the law is solely determined by people's beliefs. Recognizing the law's internal logic allows for improved interpretations, including understanding the intentions of the original authors.

Sajjad1994 · Answer

Explanation

3. Which one of the following most accurately characterizes the author’s attitude toward Dworkin’s theory?

Explanation

Up to now our discussion of the passage and questions has lumped together the author’s views and Dworkin’s views as if they were indistinguishable. And so they are; Dworkin’s critiques and new theory are presented with not a bit of demurral.

(A)  has it right. There’s no evidence of caution  (B)  in the author’s treatment of Dworkin.  (C)  is even more negative.  (D)  and  (E)  are positive but otherwise go wrong.  (D)  marginalizes the appeal of Dworkin’s theory solely to originality, and  (E)  wrongly implies that the author cares about which theory is  “most popular.”

Answer: A

VerbalBot · Answer

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Ronald Dworkin argues that judges are in danger of uncritically embrac

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