RonPurewal
Granville and Coates’ analysis of North American heavy manufacturing found that companies operating across multiple industries generate more value, and therefore are valued more highly, than clusters of smaller, more specialized companies that have the same overall scope as the larger diversified corporation if considered together. Granville and Coates conjectured that the added premium reflects reduced earnings volatility: diversified firms can spread risk across multiple largely independent lines of business, reducing investors’ stochastic exposure to firm-specific shocks. After several scholars published remarkably parallel findings from other economic sectors, theoretical economists began in earnest to explore whether more general laws might be at work.
Those investigations were barely underway when Campa and Kedia shocked the field with their analysis of just-in-time and short-turnover supply chains, in which diversified corporations, almost without exception, were valued lower than the sum of the valuations at which their component operations would have been traded as separate corporate entities. Campa and Kedia called this pattern “the diversification discount”; they hypothesized that the companies’ discounted valuations were direct consequences of logistical inefficiencies born of diversification itself, such as cross-subsidization of underperforming divisions by more profitable ones or knots of intra-corporate conflicts that made it effectively impossible for the company to boost any component of its valuation without a diminution in another one.
Villalonga et al, by contrast, looked further back, unpacking the motivational factors behind companies’ original diversification initiatives. They found in most cases that shortfalls in market valuation predated the companies’ acquisitions of further lines of business, reflecting fundamental inefficiencies that were already deeply embedded in the less-diversified companies’ core business operations. Noting a near-ubiquitous pattern of declining efficiency leading up to each company’s acquisition of new lines of business, Villalonga et al argue against the use of the term “diversification discount”, making a compelling case that companies often—perhaps even usually—diversify in an attempt to run away from, or at least to reduce the relative footprint of, dysfunctions too thoroughly entrenched to root out.
1. The passage does NOT mention any scholarly hypotheses indicating that the valuation of a diversified company can be
A. lower than the combined valuation of its component businesses considered separately, as a result of diversification
B. lower than the combined valuation of its component businesses considered separately, not as a result of diversification
C. higher than the combined valuation of its component businesses considered separately, as a result of diversification
D. higher than the combined valuation of its component businesses considered separately, not as a result of diversification
E. All of the above are mentioned.
2. The hypotheses put forward by Campa and Kedia to explain the discounted valuations of diversified companies assume that
A. the companies were not losing value in the time leading up to their acquisition of additional lines of business
B. the diversified companies attempted to raise the valuations of all of their component businesses simultaneously
C. many of the intra-corporate conflicts apparent after diversification had roots in the structure or operations of the original company
D. those companies’ diversification did not reduce their investors’ exposure to earnings volatility
E. the underperforming divisions subsidized by diversified companies’ other divisions were not the companies’ original lines of business
3. The primary purpose of the passage is to
A. argue, with counterevidence, that early hypotheses about the valuations of diversified corporations are flawed
B. demonstrate that the cost or benefit to a corporation of acquiring additional lines of business is mainly a function of industry-specific conditions
C. present contrasting sets of research findings with possible explanations for each
D. show, through examples, that researchers analyzing the same data with the same methods can reach opposing conclusions
E. summarize the original research behind a theory and the later findings that led to a refinement of that theory
4. It can be inferred that Villalonga et al object to the use of the term “diversification discount” primarily because
A. a company’s acquisition of additional lines of business may not, in fact, decrease the overall degree of risk faced by its investors
B. it wrongly implies that diversified corporations tend to be undervalued by the market
C. that name suggests a causal relationship that does not hold in most instances of the phenomenon being named
D. the named phenomenon does not obtain for all corporations that diversify their business
E. the term Implies the existence of a significant correlation between two variables that are in fact largely independent
Official Explanation:1. The passage does NOT mention any scholarly hypotheses indicating that the valuation of a diversified company can beA. lower than the combined valuation of its component businesses considered separately, as a result of diversification
B. lower than the combined valuation of its component businesses considered separately, not as a result of diversification
C. higher than the combined valuation of its component businesses considered separately, as a result of diversification
D. higher than the combined valuation of its component businesses considered separately, not as a result of diversification
E. All of the above are mentioned.
This question asks about the specific examples that the author explicitly mentions in the passage. The solution is ultimately going to be a matter of searching the text for the required types of hypothetical explanations—and selecting the choice corresponding to the type of example that you DON’T find (or selecting the last choice, if you find all four types)—but if you have a rough “table of contents” from your initial reading, telling you
what kinds of information are located
where, then that hunt should be much more efficient.
Valuations of diversified companies that are
lower than those of the separate components combined are discussed in the second and third paragraphs, so let’s look in those two paragraphs for the types of hypotheses listed in choices A and B:
• A: The hypotheses of Campa and Kedia satisfy this description. (The passage explicitly confirms that Campa and Kedia’s hypothetical explanations were “consequences of logistical inefficiencies born of diversification itself”—in other words, results of diversification.)
• B: Villalonga
et al, as discussed in the final paragraph, attribute the lowered valuations of certain diversified corporations to structural problems that existed previously, and hypothesize that the diversification itself is “an attempt to run away from, or at least reduce the relative footprint of” those problems.
Both are present.
Valuations of diversified companies that are
higher than those of the separate components combined are discussed in the first paragraph, so let’s look there for the types of hypotheses listed in choices C and D.
Only one hypothesis is listed for Granville and Coates in this paragraph: the reduction of investor exposure to economic shocks by spreading risk across the greater variety of lines of business. This is a direct result of the acquisition of those additional lines of business—i.e., a direct consequence of diversification—so this is the type of hypothesis listed in choice C.
The passage therefore does NOT mention any hypothesis of the kind listed in choice D, making
D the correct answer.
2. The hypotheses put forward by Campa and Kedia to explain the discounted valuations of diversified companies assume thatA. the companies were not losing value in the time leading up to their acquisition of additional lines of business
B. the diversified companies attempted to raise the valuations of all of their component businesses simultaneously
C. many of the intra-corporate conflicts apparent after diversification had roots in the structure or operations of the original company
D. those companies’ diversification did not reduce their investors’ exposure to earnings volatility
E. the underperforming divisions subsidized by diversified companies’ other divisions were not the companies’ original lines of business
According to the second paragraph, Campa and Kedia blamed the shortfall in the valuations of diversified corporations on “logistical inefficiencies born of diversification itself, such as cross-subsidization ... or intra-corporate conflicts”. In other words, Campa and Kedia hypothesize that these problems newly arise in corporations that have subsumed their full current range of diversified lines of business. They assume, in other words, that the less diversified, pre-acquisition corporations were NOT valued lower than they would otherwise have been because of these same problems.
In terms of intra-corporate conflicts, therefore, Campa and Kedia are assuming that no such conflicts existed among the divisions of the original (pre-diversified) corporation to the detriment of its value back then. Choice C appears to touch on this idea, but states the opposite of what Campa and Kedia assume.
In terms of poorly performing divisions being subsidized by their high-performing counterparts, Campa and Kedia are taking for granted that those underperforming businesses are among the diverse components newly acquired by the corporation. If the underperforming units—whose underperformance is the underlying cause of the loss of valuation—were core parts of the company before diversification, then the original company’s valuation would have already been similarly penalized (perhaps even more severely, if there were no subsidies available from better-performing divisions); in other words, the problem in this case would have been pre-existing, not “born of diversification itself”.
Campa and Kedia must therefore be assuming that the underperforming divisions that receive subsidies from other components of the company are among the newly acquired lines of business.
The answer is E.Choices A and D are factors about which Campa and Kedia assume nothing. They assume—in fact, they explicitly state—that
the problems responsible for the valuation “penalty” on diversified companies do not trace back any further than the diversification itself, but they do not go so far as to preclude
any losses, including those due to normal market fluctuations (as choice A would require if assumed). Choice D, in addition to being unnecessary to Campa and Kedia’s theory, is probably false (if additional lines of business are introduced, then the presence of those extra investment options most likely
does insulate investors against risk); what Campa and Kedia
do assume is that the lowering of valuation by the factors they cite
outweighs any gains in valuation that might result from reduced risk.
3. The primary purpose of the passage is toA. argue, with counterevidence, that early hypotheses about the valuations of diversified corporations are flawed
B. demonstrate that the cost or benefit to a corporation of acquiring additional lines of business is mainly a function of industry-specific conditions
C. present contrasting sets of research findings with possible explanations for each
D. show, through examples, that researchers analyzing the same data with the same methods can reach opposing conclusions
E. summarize the original research behind a theory and the later findings that led to a refinement of that theory
To piece together the primary purpose, let’s summarize the contents of the passage at the per-paragraph level, in a sort of rough “table of contents”.
¶1:
• Studies: Diversification (add’l lines of business) —> Valued HIGHER than sum of parts
• Possible explanation
¶2:
• Studies: Diversification (add’l lines of business) —> Valued LOWER than sum of parts
• Possible explanations
¶3:
• Other possible explanations for the phenomenon in ¶2
• Differ on whether the issues are new (upon diversification) or pre-existing
Packing this up even more compactly—to get it into approximately the same length as the answer choices presented here—we have studies with contrasting/opposite findings, and then potential (hypothetical) explanations for each set of findings.
That’s choice C.Choice A is incorrect because the studies showing lower valuations after diversification do not contradict those showing higher valuations; in other words, the specifics in paragraphs 2 and 3 are not “counterevidence” to those in paragraph 1. (They would only be counterevidence if both sets of studies were done on the same companies over the same mergers and acquisitions. There is nothing to suggest any overlap; in fact, the author explicitly notes that the Campa and Kedia study covered a different industry than did the Granville and Coates study.)
None of the hypotheses advanced in the passage to explain the offset of diversified corporations’ valuations in
either direction—either over or under the sum of valuations of their component businesses considered independently—attribute any of those effects to industry-specific particulars, so choice B is unsupported.
Choice D, like choice A, relies on the notion that Campa and Kedia studied the same set of businesses over the same timeframes as Granville and Coates did. This is false, as discussed above under choice A.
Choice E is wrong because showing that the
exact opposite of a theory’s predictions can
also happen (for other reasons) is not a “refinement” of the original theory.
4. It can be inferred that Villalonga et al object to the use of the term “diversification discount” primarily becauseA. a company’s acquisition of additional lines of business may not, in fact, decrease the overall degree of risk faced by its investors
B. it wrongly implies that diversified corporations tend to be undervalued by the market
C. that name suggests a causal relationship that does not hold in most instances of the phenomenon being named
D. the named phenomenon does not obtain for all corporations that diversify their business
E. the term Implies the existence of a significant correlation between two variables that are in fact largely independent
“Villalonga
et al argue against the use of the term ‘diversification discount’ “ is the main clause of the sentence describing the work of Villalonga
et al (at the end of the passage), so their objection to that term must lie at the heart of their main conclusion/thesis. We can therefore answer this question by understanding the main point that Villalonga
et al made, and then specifically honing in on why that point makes the term “diversification discount” fundamentally a misnomer (or otherwise inappropriate as presently used).
Villalonga
et al’s main point is that most companies that underwent diversification (= acquisition of additional lines of business) already had depressed valuations before they diversified. In other words, while there may be a significant
correlation between corporate diversification and depressed valuation, in most cases the diversification itself cannot possibly have
caused the companies’ valuations to go down, because the depressed valuation came first.
This reversed causation is the only possible basis for Villalonga
et al‘s objection to the term “diversification discount”. According to Villalonga
et al, that name implies that “diversification” is the cause and “discount” the effect—a relationship that does not, in fact, obtain for most of the companies that they studied.
This is choice C.Choice A is incorrect because the “discount” in this case is a relative decrement in corporate valuation, not a reduction in investors’ risk exposure.
By pointing out the pre-existing inefficiencies that often motivate companies to diversify, Villalonga
et al show that those companies
should be valued below the sum of the average market values of their parts, and therefore that those companies are
properly valued—not undervalued as choice B says—at a “discount”.
Choice D is unfounded because the term “diversification discount” only applies to those diversified corporations whose valuations are, in fact, discounted from the theoretical sum of their parts. (The same is true across other names of this type. For instance, the term “midlife crisis” only describes the mental health of individuals who experience personal crises in middle age; the use of this term in no way implies that
all middle-aged persons experience such crises.)
Finally, choice E is just factually incorrect, because there IS a significant correlation between diversification and depressed market valuation among the companies examined by Villalonga
et al; it’s the
direction of cause and effect that Villalonga
et al are saying is mischaracterized by the term.