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12 Feb 2026, 18:21
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29% (02:27) correct
71%
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Certain philosophers maintain that the moral status of an action depends entirely on the agent’s governing maxim—that is, the principle the agent would endorse as justification for acting. However, since individuals frequently rationalize their conduct and may be unaware of the considerations that in fact move them, one can never be certain what maxim truly governed another person’s action. Therefore, any attempt to assess the moral status of another’s action is fundamentally misguided, and one ought instead to appraise actions exclusively in terms of their observable effects.
Which of the following principles, if valid, most strongly supports the reasoning above?
(A) If the moral status of an action depends solely on the principle that governed it, then ignorance of that principle precludes knowledge of the action’s moral status.
(B) When an agent’s stated justification for acting differs from the considerations that in fact motivated the action, the action lacks genuine moral worth.
(C) The observable effects of an action provide a more reliable basis for evaluation than do unverifiable claims about an agent’s internal deliberations.
(D) An action cannot be said to possess moral worth unless it proceeds from a maxim that the agent could consistently will to be universal.
(E) If an action’s moral status cannot be determined with certainty, then it should not be evaluated in moral terms at all.
Which of the following principles, if valid, most strongly supports the reasoning above?
(A) If the moral status of an action depends solely on the principle that governed it, then ignorance of that principle precludes knowledge of the action’s moral status.
(B) When an agent’s stated justification for acting differs from the considerations that in fact motivated the action, the action lacks genuine moral worth.
(C) The observable effects of an action provide a more reliable basis for evaluation than do unverifiable claims about an agent’s internal deliberations.
(D) An action cannot be said to possess moral worth unless it proceeds from a maxim that the agent could consistently will to be universal.
(E) If an action’s moral status cannot be determined with certainty, then it should not be evaluated in moral terms at all.
12 Feb 2026, 21:40
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Premise 1: The moral status of an action depends entirely on the agent’s governing maxim.
Premise 2: We can never be certain what maxim actually governed another person’s action.
Meaning, we can never be certain of the moral status of another person’s action.
Conclusion: So attempts to assess the moral status of others’ actions are misguided, and we should instead evaluate actions by their observable effects.
The key logical move is from:
We cannot know the governing maxim
to
We cannot know the moral status of the action
That requires the principle that if moral status depends solely on the governing maxim, then ignorance of that maxim prevents knowledge of the moral status.
Choice (A) states exactly that:
If the moral status of an action depends solely on the principle that governed it, then ignorance of that principle precludes knowledge of the action’s moral status.
This bridges the gap in the reasoning and directly supports the conclusion that assessing others’ actions morally is misguided.
Premise 2: We can never be certain what maxim actually governed another person’s action.
Meaning, we can never be certain of the moral status of another person’s action.
Conclusion: So attempts to assess the moral status of others’ actions are misguided, and we should instead evaluate actions by their observable effects.
The key logical move is from:
We cannot know the governing maxim
to
We cannot know the moral status of the action
That requires the principle that if moral status depends solely on the governing maxim, then ignorance of that maxim prevents knowledge of the moral status.
Choice (A) states exactly that:
If the moral status of an action depends solely on the principle that governed it, then ignorance of that principle precludes knowledge of the action’s moral status.
This bridges the gap in the reasoning and directly supports the conclusion that assessing others’ actions morally is misguided.
12 Feb 2026, 22:15
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Bookmarks
Certain philosophers maintain that the moral status of an action depends entirely on the agent’s governing maxim. However, since individuals frequently rationalize their conduct and may be unaware of what in fact moves them, one can never be certain what maxim truly governed another person’s action. Therefore, any attempt to assess the moral status of another’s action is fundamentally misguided, and one ought instead to appraise actions exclusively in terms of their observable effects.
Which of the following principles, if valid, most strongly supports the reasoning above?
If moral status depends only on the agent’s governing maxim, and we cannot know that maxim for other people, then judging their moral status is not possible, so the argument shifts to judging observable effects instead.
(A) If the moral status of an action depends solely on the principle that governed it, then ignorance of that principle precludes knowledge of the action’s moral status.
This is the missing bridge. The passage says we cannot be sure what principle governed another person’s act. This principle says that if you do not know the governing principle, you cannot know the moral status. That directly supports the core inference that assessing another’s action’s moral status is misguided.
(B) When an agent’s stated justification for acting differs from the considerations that in fact motivated the action, the action lacks genuine moral worth.
This talks about when actions lack moral worth. The passage is about our inability to know which maxim governed the action, not about whether mismatches destroy moral worth.
(C) The observable effects of an action provide a more reliable basis for evaluation than do unverifiable claims about an agent’s internal deliberations.
This supports the recommendation to look at effects, but it does not justify the key step that we cannot know moral status if it depends entirely on the maxim. It argues “more reliable,” not “knowledge is impossible.”
(D) An action cannot be said to possess moral worth unless it proceeds from a maxim that the agent could consistently will to be universal.
This is a separate moral rule about which maxims confer moral worth. It does not address the passage’s epistemic problem of not being able to identify the maxim in others.
(E) If an action’s moral status cannot be determined with certainty, then it should not be evaluated in moral terms at all.
This supports the move from uncertainty to “do not evaluate morally,” but it is not as tightly matched as (A) because (A) connects specifically to the passage’s stated dependency: moral status depends solely on the governing maxim.
Answer: (A)
Which of the following principles, if valid, most strongly supports the reasoning above?
If moral status depends only on the agent’s governing maxim, and we cannot know that maxim for other people, then judging their moral status is not possible, so the argument shifts to judging observable effects instead.
(A) If the moral status of an action depends solely on the principle that governed it, then ignorance of that principle precludes knowledge of the action’s moral status.
This is the missing bridge. The passage says we cannot be sure what principle governed another person’s act. This principle says that if you do not know the governing principle, you cannot know the moral status. That directly supports the core inference that assessing another’s action’s moral status is misguided.
(B) When an agent’s stated justification for acting differs from the considerations that in fact motivated the action, the action lacks genuine moral worth.
This talks about when actions lack moral worth. The passage is about our inability to know which maxim governed the action, not about whether mismatches destroy moral worth.
(C) The observable effects of an action provide a more reliable basis for evaluation than do unverifiable claims about an agent’s internal deliberations.
This supports the recommendation to look at effects, but it does not justify the key step that we cannot know moral status if it depends entirely on the maxim. It argues “more reliable,” not “knowledge is impossible.”
(D) An action cannot be said to possess moral worth unless it proceeds from a maxim that the agent could consistently will to be universal.
This is a separate moral rule about which maxims confer moral worth. It does not address the passage’s epistemic problem of not being able to identify the maxim in others.
(E) If an action’s moral status cannot be determined with certainty, then it should not be evaluated in moral terms at all.
This supports the move from uncertainty to “do not evaluate morally,” but it is not as tightly matched as (A) because (A) connects specifically to the passage’s stated dependency: moral status depends solely on the governing maxim.
Answer: (A)
