Remember the journal’s claim: subjects formed beliefs from false statements, were later told those statements were untrue, yet still mostly kept the beliefs. The journal concludes that people continue to hold acquired beliefs even without credible supporting evidence. To
undermine that conclusion, you must show a reason why the experimental result would not imply belief persistence without proof.
A. "Regardless of the truth of what the subjects were later told, the beliefs based on the original statements were, for the most part, correct."
Why this fails to undermine: If the beliefs were correct (independently true), then persistence is not irrational, but this option doesn't say the subjects had any
evidence for those beliefs after being told the originals were false. It just says the beliefs happened to be true. The journal’s claim is about continuing to hold beliefs
in the absence of credible evidence; truth by coincidence does not show that subjects had evidence. So A might weaken the perceived irrationality, but does not explain persistence in terms of reasoned support. It does not directly undercut the journal’s stated inference that people keep beliefs without credible evidence. Eliminate A.
B. "It is unrealistic to expect people to keep track of the original basis of their beliefs, and to revise a belief when its original basis is undercut."
Why this fails to undermine: This explains why people might fail to revise — cognitive limitation or memory lapse — but it does not contradict the journal’s empirical observation that people continued to hold beliefs after being told the original statements were false. Instead, B offers an alternative explanation (forgetting the source), but that alternative still supports the journal’s behavioral claim (people keep beliefs). The journal’s conclusion is normative/diagnostic (“people continue to hold onto acquired beliefs even in the absence of any credible evidence”); B doesn’t provide evidence that the subjects actually
had credible evidence afterward — it merely explains why they might not update. It might even strengthen the journal’s conclusion (people hold onto beliefs despite being told otherwise). So, B does not undermine the conclusion; eliminate B.
C. "The statements originally given to the subjects would be highly misleading even if true."
Why this fails to undermine: This says the original statements were misleading, but the experiment already said the original statements were false. Even if they would be misleading if true, that does not explain why subjects continued to hold beliefs or whether they later had evidence. This option is tangential: it criticizes the materials but does not show that the subjects had independent, credible evidence or that the journal’s inference is invalid. Eliminate C.
D. "Most of the subjects had acquired confirmation of their newly acquired beliefs by the time they were told that the original statements were false."
Why this undermines: If subjects had obtained
independent confirmation before being told the statements were false, then their continued belief after being told the original statements were false would no longer be evidence that they retained beliefs in the absence of credible evidence. They would be retaining beliefs that had independent supporting evidence. That directly refutes the journal’s inference that belief persistence occurred
without credible evidence. The result would be consistent with rational updating (they keep their belief because they have other confirmations. Therefore, D directly undermines the journal’s conclusion. Keep D.
E. "Most of the subjects were initially skeptical of the statements originally given to them."
Why this fails to undermine: If people were initially skeptical, two things could follow: they might not have formed firm beliefs, or they might have later been persuaded by repeated exposure and then kept their beliefs. The crucial point is whether, when told the statements were false, they still had credible evidence or not. Initial skepticism does not establish that they had independent confirming evidence later; it might simply mean they were hesitant initially but eventually accepted the claim and then retained it. So E does not directly show that retention was based on evidence. It at best complicates the interpretation but does not undercut the journal’s inference. Eliminate E.
Conclusion: D is the only option that directly shows the subjects could have had independent supporting evidence for their beliefs before being told the originals were false, and so it most effectively undermines the journal’s claim that belief persistence occurred in the absence of credible evidence.
akela
Economist: Historically, sunflower seed was one of the largest production crops in Kalotopia, and it continues to be a major source of income for several countries. The renewed growing of sunflowers would provide relief to Kalotopia’s farming industry, which is quite unstable. Further, sunflower oil can provide a variety of products, both industrial and consumer, at little cost to Kalotopia’s already fragile environment.
The economist’s statements, if true, most strongly support which one of the following?
(A) Kalotopia’s farming industry will deteriorate if sunflowers are not grown there.
(B) Stabilizing Kalotopia’s farming industry would improve the economy without damaging the environment.
(C) Kalotopia’s farming industry would be better off now if it had never ceased to grow any of the crops that historically were large production crops.
(D) A crop that was once a large production crop in Kalotopia would, if it were grown there again, benefit that country’s farmers and general economy.
(E) Sunflower seed is a better crop for Kalotopia from both the environmental and the economic viewpoints than are most crops that could be grown there.