GMAT Question of the Day - Daily to your Mailbox; hard ones only

It is currently 14 Oct 2019, 08:51

Close

GMAT Club Daily Prep

Thank you for using the timer - this advanced tool can estimate your performance and suggest more practice questions. We have subscribed you to Daily Prep Questions via email.

Customized
for You

we will pick new questions that match your level based on your Timer History

Track
Your Progress

every week, we’ll send you an estimated GMAT score based on your performance

Practice
Pays

we will pick new questions that match your level based on your Timer History

Not interested in getting valuable practice questions and articles delivered to your email? No problem, unsubscribe here.

Close

Request Expert Reply

Confirm Cancel

After the Second World War, unionism in the Japanese auto

  post reply Question banks Downloads My Bookmarks Reviews Important topics  
Author Message
Intern
Intern
avatar
Joined: 03 Apr 2012
Posts: 5
After the Second World War, unionism in the Japanese auto  [#permalink]

Show Tags

New post 19 May 2012, 07:18
2
After the Second World War, unionism in the Japanese auto industry was company-based, with separate unions in each auto company. Most company unions played no independent role in bargaining shop-floor issues or pressing autoworkers' grievances. In a 1981 survey, for example, fewer than 1 percent of workers said they sought union assistance for work-related problems, while 43 percent said they turned to management instead. There was little to distinguish the two in any case: most union officers were foremen or middle-level managers, and the union's role was primarily one of passive support for company goals. Conflict occasionally disrupted this cooperative relationship--one company union's opposition to the productivity campaigns of the early 1980s has been cited as such a case. In 1986, however, a caucus led by the Foreman's Association forced the union's leadership out of office and returned the union's policy to one of passive cooperation. In the United States, the potential for such company unionism grew after 1979, but it had difficulty taking hold in the auto industry, where a single union represented workers from all companies, particularly since federal law prohibited foremen from joining or leading industrial unions.

The Japanese model was often invoked as one in which authority decentralized to the shop floor empowered production workers to make key decisions. What these claims failed to recognize was that the actual delegation of authority was to the foreman, not the workers. The foreman exercised discretion over job assignments, training, transfers, and promotions; worker initiative was limited to suggestions that fine-tuned a management-controlled production process. Rather than being proactive, Japanese workers were forced to be reactive, the range of their responsibilities being far wider than their span of control. For example, the founder of one production system, Taichi Ohno, routinely gave department managers only 90 percent of the resources needed for production. As soon as workers could meet production goals without working overtime, 10 percent of remaining resources would be removed. Because the "OH! NO!" system continually pushed the production process to the verge of breakdown in an effort to find the minimum resource requirement, critics described it as "management by stress."
The passage is primarily concerned with
(A) contrasting the role of unions in the Japanese auto industry with the role of unions in the United States auto industry after the Second World War
(B) describing unionism and the situation of workers in the Japanese auto industry after the Second World War
(C) providing examples of grievances of Japanese auto workers against the auto industry after the Second World War
(D) correcting a misconception about the role of the foreman in the Japanese auto industry's union system after the Second World War
(E) reasserting the traditional view of the company's role in Japanese auto workers' unions after the Second World War

Manager
Manager
avatar
B
Joined: 16 Apr 2018
Posts: 81
Re: After the Second World War, unionism in the Japanese auto  [#permalink]

Show Tags

New post 02 Mar 2019, 01:06
1
The passage is primarily concerned with
(A) contrasting the role of unions in the Japanese auto industry with the role of unions in the United States auto industry after the Second World War - Though discussed it is not the main point.
(B) describing unionism and the situation of workers in the Japanese auto industry after the Second World War - Seems correct. hold!
(C) providing examples of grievances of Japanese auto workers against the auto industry after the Second World War - No examples have been presented about grieviences of Jap Auto workers. Out.
(D) correcting a misconception about the role of the foreman in the Japanese auto industry's union system after the Second World War. Thought the second paragraph tells us about the misconception, and tries to steer the discussion in that direction, the passage returns to the situation of workers (passive role, subordinates of companies, fine-tuning companies policies/direction)
(E) reasserting the traditional view of the company's role in Japanese auto workers' unions after the Second World War - No traditional views have been talked about. The passage clearly mentions about the situation after second World War.

Hence, B.

Please let me know in case my understanding is incorrect.

Thanks!
Intern
Intern
User avatar
B
Joined: 19 Sep 2015
Posts: 11
Re: After the Second World War, unionism in the Japanese auto  [#permalink]

Show Tags

New post 31 Mar 2019, 23:34
1
massi2884 wrote:
After the Second World War, unionism in the Japanese auto industry was company-based, with separate unions in each auto company. Most company unions played no independent role in bargaining shop-floor issues or pressing autoworkers' grievances. In a 1981 survey, for example, fewer than 1 percent of workers said they sought union assistance for work-related problems, while 43 percent said they turned to management instead. There was little to distinguish the two in any case: most union officers were foremen or middle-level managers, and the union's role was primarily one of passive support for company goals. Conflict occasionally disrupted this cooperative relationship--one company union's opposition to the productivity campaigns of the early 1980s has been cited as such a case. In 1986, however, a caucus led by the Foreman's Association forced the union's leadership out of office and returned the union's policy to one of passive cooperation. In the United States, the potential for such company unionism grew after 1979, but it had difficulty taking hold in the auto industry, where a single union represented workers from all companies, particularly since federal law prohibited foremen from joining or leading industrial unions.

The Japanese model was often invoked as one in which authority decentralized to the shop floor empowered production workers to make key decisions. What these claims failed to recognize was that the actual delegation of authority was to the foreman, not the workers. The foreman exercised discretion over job assignments, training, transfers, and promotions; worker initiative was limited to suggestions that fine-tuned a management-controlled production process. Rather than being proactive, Japanese workers were forced to be reactive, the range of their responsibilities being far wider than their span of control. For example, the founder of one production system, Taichi Ohno, routinely gave department managers only 90 percent of the resources needed for production. As soon as workers could meet production goals without working overtime, 10 percent of remaining resources would be removed. Because the "OH! NO!" system continually pushed the production process to the verge of breakdown in an effort to find the minimum resource requirement, critics described it as "management by stress."
The passage is primarily concerned with
(A) contrasting the role of unions in the Japanese auto industry with the role of unions in the United States auto industry after the Second World War
(B) describing unionism and the situation of workers in the Japanese auto industry after the Second World War
(C) providing examples of grievances of Japanese auto workers against the auto industry after the Second World War
(D) correcting a misconception about the role of the foreman in the Japanese auto industry's union system after the Second World War
(E) reasserting the traditional view of the company's role in Japanese auto workers' unions after the Second World War


Some More questions from the passage.
2. It can be inferred that the author of the passage sees which of the following as the primary advantage to companies in implementing the "OH! NO!" system?
(A) It permitted the foreman to take initiative.
(B) It minimized the effort required to produce automobiles.
(C) It ensured that production costs would be as low as possible.
(D) It allowed the foreman to control the production process.
(E) It required considerable worker empowerment to achieve managers' goals.
OA C
3. The author of the passage mentions the "OH! NO!" system primarily in order to
A. indicate a way in which the United States industry has become more like the Japanese auto industry
B. challenge a particular misconception about worker empowerment in the Japanese auto industry
C. illustrate the kinds of problem-solving techniques encouraged by company unions in Japan
D. suggest an effective way of minimizing production costs in auto manufacturing
E. provide an example of the responsibilities assumed by a foreman in the Japanese auto industry
OA B
4. It can be inferred that the author of the passage sees which of the following as the primary advantage to companies in implementing the "OH! NO!" system?
(A) It permitted the foreman to take initiative.
(B) It minimized the effort required to produce automobiles.
(C) It ensured that production costs would be as low as possible.
(D) It allowed the foreman to control the production process.
(E) It required considerable worker empowerment to achieve managers' goals.

OA: C
Bunuel or any other moderator, please add these questions.
_________________
Regards,
N
1. All official questions collection
Math Expert
User avatar
V
Joined: 02 Sep 2009
Posts: 58316
Re: After the Second World War, unionism in the Japanese auto  [#permalink]

Show Tags

New post 01 Apr 2019, 02:20
NHasan19058 wrote:
massi2884 wrote:
After the Second World War, unionism in the Japanese auto industry was company-based, with separate unions in each auto company. Most company unions played no independent role in bargaining shop-floor issues or pressing autoworkers' grievances. In a 1981 survey, for example, fewer than 1 percent of workers said they sought union assistance for work-related problems, while 43 percent said they turned to management instead. There was little to distinguish the two in any case: most union officers were foremen or middle-level managers, and the union's role was primarily one of passive support for company goals. Conflict occasionally disrupted this cooperative relationship--one company union's opposition to the productivity campaigns of the early 1980s has been cited as such a case. In 1986, however, a caucus led by the Foreman's Association forced the union's leadership out of office and returned the union's policy to one of passive cooperation. In the United States, the potential for such company unionism grew after 1979, but it had difficulty taking hold in the auto industry, where a single union represented workers from all companies, particularly since federal law prohibited foremen from joining or leading industrial unions.

The Japanese model was often invoked as one in which authority decentralized to the shop floor empowered production workers to make key decisions. What these claims failed to recognize was that the actual delegation of authority was to the foreman, not the workers. The foreman exercised discretion over job assignments, training, transfers, and promotions; worker initiative was limited to suggestions that fine-tuned a management-controlled production process. Rather than being proactive, Japanese workers were forced to be reactive, the range of their responsibilities being far wider than their span of control. For example, the founder of one production system, Taichi Ohno, routinely gave department managers only 90 percent of the resources needed for production. As soon as workers could meet production goals without working overtime, 10 percent of remaining resources would be removed. Because the "OH! NO!" system continually pushed the production process to the verge of breakdown in an effort to find the minimum resource requirement, critics described it as "management by stress."
The passage is primarily concerned with
(A) contrasting the role of unions in the Japanese auto industry with the role of unions in the United States auto industry after the Second World War
(B) describing unionism and the situation of workers in the Japanese auto industry after the Second World War
(C) providing examples of grievances of Japanese auto workers against the auto industry after the Second World War
(D) correcting a misconception about the role of the foreman in the Japanese auto industry's union system after the Second World War
(E) reasserting the traditional view of the company's role in Japanese auto workers' unions after the Second World War


Some More questions from the passage.
2. It can be inferred that the author of the passage sees which of the following as the primary advantage to companies in implementing the "OH! NO!" system?
(A) It permitted the foreman to take initiative.
(B) It minimized the effort required to produce automobiles.
(C) It ensured that production costs would be as low as possible.
(D) It allowed the foreman to control the production process.
(E) It required considerable worker empowerment to achieve managers' goals.
OA C
3. The author of the passage mentions the "OH! NO!" system primarily in order to
A. indicate a way in which the United States industry has become more like the Japanese auto industry
B. challenge a particular misconception about worker empowerment in the Japanese auto industry
C. illustrate the kinds of problem-solving techniques encouraged by company unions in Japan
D. suggest an effective way of minimizing production costs in auto manufacturing
E. provide an example of the responsibilities assumed by a foreman in the Japanese auto industry
OA B
4. It can be inferred that the author of the passage sees which of the following as the primary advantage to companies in implementing the "OH! NO!" system?
(A) It permitted the foreman to take initiative.
(B) It minimized the effort required to produce automobiles.
(C) It ensured that production costs would be as low as possible.
(D) It allowed the foreman to control the production process.
(E) It required considerable worker empowerment to achieve managers' goals.

OA: C
Bunuel or any other moderator, please add these questions.


Thank you.

Those questions are already added in another discussion of this problem: https://gmatclub.com/forum/after-the-se ... fl=similar

ARCHIVING THIS ONE.
_________________
GMAT Club Bot
Re: After the Second World War, unionism in the Japanese auto   [#permalink] 01 Apr 2019, 02:20
Display posts from previous: Sort by

After the Second World War, unionism in the Japanese auto

  post reply Question banks Downloads My Bookmarks Reviews Important topics  





Powered by phpBB © phpBB Group | Emoji artwork provided by EmojiOne