Can a sovereign have unlimited legal power? (Rhetorical Question) If a sovereign does have unlimited legal power, then the sovereign presumably has the legal power to limit or even completely abdicate its own legal power. But (Contrast) doing so would mean that the sovereign no longer has unlimited legal power, thereby (Causation) contradicting the initial supposition. This (Look above) theoretical conundrum is traditionally known as the paradox of omnipotence.
(Introduces the paradox of omnipotence with a rhetorical question)
Social scientists have recognized that sovereign omnipotence can be (Qualifier) a source of considerable practical difficulty for sovereigns themselves. Douglass North and Barry Weingast show that English and French monarchies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries confronted a practical challenge created by the paradox of their own omnipotence.
(Explains the practical difficulty of sovereign omnipotence to sovereign themselves)
North and Weingast point out that it is often in a sovereign’s best interest to make a credible commitment not to perform certain acts. For example (Support), a sovereign with absolute power can refuse to honor its financial commitments. Yet creditors will not voluntarily lend generous amounts at favorable terms to an absolute monarch who can renege upon debts at will.
(Explains with an example that it’s in a sovereign’s best interest to make a credible commitment not to perform certain acts)
In the struggle to expand their empires, the English and French monarchies required vast amounts of capital. At the outset of the seventeenth century, however (Contrast), neither regime could credibly commit itself to repay debts or to honor property rights. The absence of limitations upon the legal power of monarchs meant that there was no law or commitment monarchs could make that they could not also unmake or disregard. Consequently (Causation), these monarchs earned a reputation for expropriating wealth, repudiating debts, and reneging upon commitments. Not surprisingly, creditors took such (Look above) behavior into account and demanded higher interest rates from monarchs than from the monarchs’ wealthy subjects.
(Explains the misuse of sovereign powers of the monarchs and the consequence of creditors charging higher interest rates from them)
North and Weingast argue (Opinion) that the constitutional settlement imposed in England by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 halted such faithless conduct. Henceforth, Parliament controlled the Crown’s purse strings. Parliament, in turn, represented commercial interests that would not tolerate governmental disregard for property rights. The Crown’s newfound inability to dishonor its commitments translated into a newfound ability to borrow: the Crown’s borrowing increased and interest rates fell, because lenders concluded that the Crown would honor its debts.
(Talks about the opinion of N & W that the reason lenders concluded that the crown would honor its debt was that the Parliament started controlling the Crown’s finances)
Thanks to North, Weingast, and others writing in the same vein, it is now conventional to hold that constitutional arrangements benefit sovereigns by limiting their power. But (Contrast) such scholars neglect the extent to which constitutions can fail in this (Look above0 regard. For example, the constitutional settlement imposed by the Glorious Revolution did not solve the paradox of omnipotence but just relocated the problem from one branch of government to another: whereas (Contrast) it was once the Crown that lacked the power to bind itself, it is now Parliament that lacks this power. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a pillar of England’s unwritten constitution, and it provides that Parliament lacks legal power over the extent of its own legal power.
(Talks about how the conventional view came about because N, W and other writers. Also, the author gives his opinion on how these scholars neglect the extent to which constitution can fail in the regard that constitutional arrangements benefit sovereigns limiting their powers)
P1: Introduces the paradox of omnipotence with a rhetorical question
P2: Explains the practical difficulty of sovereign omnipotence to sovereign themselves
P3: Explains with an example that it’s in a sovereign’s best interest to make a credible commitment not to perform certain acts
P4: Explains the misuse of sovereign powers of the monarchs and the consequence of creditors charging higher interest rates from them
P5: Talks about the opinion of N & W that the reason lenders concluded that the crown would honor its debt was that the Parliament started controlling the Crown’s finances
P6: Talks about how the conventional view came about because N, W and other writers. Also, the author gives his opinion on how these scholars neglect the extent to which constitution can fail in the regard that constitutional arrangements benefit sovereigns limiting their powers
All this passage is about is the paradox of sovereign omnipotence and how the conventional view regarding the solution to sovereign omnipotence came about. Also, it concludes with the author’s opinion saying that conventional view fails to account that the solution can fail.