Can a sovereign have unlimited legal power? If a sovereign does have u

Question

Can a sovereign have unlimited legal power? If a sovereign does have unlimited legal power, then the sovereign presumably has the legal power to limit or even completely abdicate its own legal power. But doing so would mean that the sovereign no longer has unlimited legal power, thereby contradicting the initial supposition. This theoretical conundrum is traditionally known as the paradox of omnipotence.

Social scientists have recognized that sovereign omnipotence can be a source of considerable practical difficulty for sovereigns themselves. Douglass North and Barry Weingast show that English and French monarchies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries confronted a practical challenge created by the paradox of their own omnipotence.

North and Weingast point out that it is often in a sovereign’s best interest to make a credible commitment not to perform certain acts. For example, a sovereign with absolute power can refuse to honor its financial commitments. Yet creditors will not voluntarily lend generous amounts at favorable terms to an absolute monarch who can renege upon debts at will.

In the struggle to expand their empires, the English and French monarchies required vast amounts of capital.  At the outset of the seventeenth century, however, neither regime could credibly commit itself to repay debts or to honor property rights. The absence of limitations upon the legal power of monarchs meant that there was no law or commitment monarchs could make that they could not also unmake or disregard. Consequently, these monarchs earned a reputation for expropriating wealth, repudiating debts, and reneging upon commitments. Not surprisingly, creditors took such behavior into account and demanded higher interest rates from monarchs than from the monarchs’ wealthy subjects.

North and Weingast argue that the constitutional settlement imposed in England by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 halted such faithless conduct. Henceforth, Parliament controlled the Crown’s purse strings. Parliament, in turn, represented commercial interests that would not tolerate governmental disregard for property rights. The Crown’s newfound inability to dishonor its commitments translated into a newfound ability to borrow: the Crown’s borrowing increased and interest rates fell, because lenders concluded that the Crown would honor its debts.

Thanks to North, Weingast, and others writing in the same vein, it is now conventional to hold that constitutional arrangements benefit sovereigns by limiting their power. But such scholars neglect the extent to which constitutions can fail in this regard. For example, the constitutional settlement imposed by the Glorious Revolution did not solve the paradox of omnipotence but just relocated the problem from one branch of government to another: whereas it was once the Crown that lacked the power to bind itself, it is now Parliament that lacks this power. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a pillar of England’s unwritten constitution, and it provides that Parliament lacks legal power over the extent of its own legal power.    1 
 1. Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?

(A) The paradox of omnipotence poses a practical problem for governments, which is not necessarily solved by constitutional arrangements.
(B) Abstract theoretical paradoxes often have practical analogues in the political sphere.
(C) The paradox of omnipotence ceased to be an acute practical problem for English monarchs after the Glorious Revolution.
(D) Contrary to what many social scientists believe, the Glorious Revolution did not solve the practical problem of sovereign omnipotence faced by English monarchs.
(E) The supposition that a sovereign has unlimited legal power leads to a logical contradiction.

2 
 2. The passage most strongly supports the claim that creditors in England and France in the years before 1688 held which one of the following views about wealthy subjects in those countries?

(A) They did not contribute their fair share to the cost of expanding the empires.
(B) They focused on short-term gains at the expense of their own credibility.
(C) They were trying to establish a government that would respect property rights.
(D) They clearly understood the paradox of sovereign omnipotence.
(E) They were more likely than their monarchs to honor financial commitments.

3 
 3. Based on the passage, which one of the following considerations would be most important for an English creditor after the Glorious Revolution who is deciding whether to lend money to the Crown at a relatively low interest rate?

(A) whether most members of Parliament are aware of the paradox of sovereign omnipotence
(B) whether Parliament can be depended on to adequately represent commercial interests
(C) when the most recent Parliamentary elections were held
(D) how many new laws Parliament has enacted in the past year
(E) whether the Crown’s borrowing has increased in recent years

4 
 4. Which one of the following principles underlies the author’s argument in the last paragraph of the passage?

(A) The adequacy of a solution to a political problem should be judged in terms of practical consequences rather than theoretical considerations.
(B) A genuine solution to a political problem must eliminate the problem’s fundamental cause rather than just its effects.
(C) A problem inherent in a certain form of government can be solved only if that form of government is completely abandoned.
(D) In terms of practical consequences, it is preferable for unlimited legal power to rest with an elected body rather than an unelected monarch.
(E) A country’s constitution should explicitly specify the powers of each branch of government.

5 
 5. According to the passage, which one of the following was a consequence of the absence of limitations on the legal power of English and French monarchs in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries?

(A) It was difficult for those monarchs to finance the expansion of their empires.
(B) Those monarchs enacted new laws to specify the obligations of creditors.
(C) It became increasingly easy for wealthy subjects in England and France to borrow money.
(D) Those monarchs borrowed more money than they would have if their power had been restricted.
(E) Those monarchs were forced to demonstrate a willingness to respect property rights.

6 
 6. The author mentions the English and French monarchies’ need for capital ( Highlighted ) primarily in order to

(A) cast doubt on the claim that it is in a sovereign’s interest to make a commitment not to perform certain acts
(B) illustrate the low opinion that creditors had of monarchs
(C) emphasize the unlimited nature of the legal power of monarchs
(D) help explain why the paradox of omnipotence was an acute practical problem for those monarchies
(E) reinforce the claim that sovereigns have historically broken their commitments for short- term gain

7 
 7. Suppose the Parliament in England makes a commitment to become a permanent member of a multinational body. It can be inferred from the passage that

(A) the commitment will undermine Parliament’s ability to obtain credit on favorable terms
(B) lenders will become more confident that Parliament will honor its debts
(C) Parliament has the legal authority to end the commitment at any time
(D) the commercial interests represented by Parliament will disapprove of the commitment
(E) the commitment will increase Parliament’s legal power

8 
 8. Which one of the following claims would be accepted by North and Weingast but not by the author of the passage?

(A) After 1688, commercial interests in England trusted Parliament to protect their property rights.
(B) The paradox of omnipotence is no longer a practical problem for any actual government.
(C) In England, the Crown was able to borrow money at lower interest rates after the Glorious Revolution than before.
(D) In the seventeenth century, English and French monarchs had a reputation for failing to uphold financial commitments.
(E) The constitutional settlement imposed by the Glorious Revolution solved the problem of sovereign omnipotence.

armaankumar · Answer

Can a sovereign have unlimited legal power? (Rhetorical Question) If a sovereign does have unlimited legal power, then the sovereign presumably has the legal power to limit or even completely abdicate its own legal power. But (Contrast) doing so would mean that the sovereign no longer has unlimited legal power, thereby (Causation) contradicting the initial supposition. This (Look above) theoretical conundrum is traditionally known as the paradox of omnipotence.
(Introduces the paradox of omnipotence with a rhetorical question)

Social scientists have recognized that sovereign omnipotence can be (Qualifier) a source of considerable practical difficulty for sovereigns themselves. Douglass North and Barry Weingast show that English and French monarchies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries confronted a practical challenge created by the paradox of their own omnipotence.
(Explains the practical difficulty of sovereign omnipotence to sovereign themselves)

North and Weingast point out that it is often in a sovereign’s best interest to make a credible commitment not to perform certain acts. For example (Support), a sovereign with absolute power can refuse to honor its financial commitments. Yet creditors will not voluntarily lend generous amounts at favorable terms to an absolute monarch who can renege upon debts at will.
(Explains with an example that it’s in a sovereign’s best interest to make a credible commitment not to perform certain acts)

In the struggle to expand their empires, the English and French monarchies required vast amounts of capital. At the outset of the seventeenth century, however (Contrast), neither regime could credibly commit itself to repay debts or to honor property rights. The absence of limitations upon the legal power of monarchs meant that there was no law or commitment monarchs could make that they could not also unmake or disregard. Consequently (Causation), these monarchs earned a reputation for expropriating wealth, repudiating debts, and reneging upon commitments. Not surprisingly, creditors took such (Look above) behavior into account and demanded higher interest rates from monarchs than from the monarchs’ wealthy subjects.
(Explains the misuse of sovereign powers of the monarchs and the consequence of creditors charging higher interest rates from them)

North and Weingast argue (Opinion) that the constitutional settlement imposed in England by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 halted such faithless conduct. Henceforth, Parliament controlled the Crown’s purse strings. Parliament, in turn, represented commercial interests that would not tolerate governmental disregard for property rights. The Crown’s newfound inability to dishonor its commitments translated into a newfound ability to borrow: the Crown’s borrowing increased and interest rates fell, because lenders concluded that the Crown would honor its debts.
(Talks about the opinion of N & W that the reason lenders concluded that the crown would honor its debt was that the Parliament started controlling the Crown’s finances)

Thanks to North, Weingast, and others writing in the same vein, it is now conventional to hold that constitutional arrangements benefit sovereigns by limiting their power. But (Contrast) such scholars neglect the extent to which constitutions can fail in this (Look above0 regard. For example, the constitutional settlement imposed by the Glorious Revolution did not solve the paradox of omnipotence but just relocated the problem from one branch of government to another: whereas (Contrast) it was once the Crown that lacked the power to bind itself, it is now Parliament that lacks this power. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a pillar of England’s unwritten constitution, and it provides that Parliament lacks legal power over the extent of its own legal power.
(Talks about how the conventional view came about because N, W and other writers. Also, the author gives his opinion on how these scholars neglect the extent to which constitution can fail in the regard that constitutional arrangements benefit sovereigns limiting their powers)

P1: Introduces the paradox of omnipotence with a rhetorical question
P2: Explains the practical difficulty of sovereign omnipotence to sovereign themselves
P3: Explains with an example that it’s in a sovereign’s best interest to make a credible commitment not to perform certain acts
P4: Explains the misuse of sovereign powers of the monarchs and the consequence of creditors charging higher interest rates from them
P5: Talks about the opinion of N & W that the reason lenders concluded that the crown would honor its debt was that the Parliament started controlling the Crown’s finances
P6: Talks about how the conventional view came about because N, W and other writers. Also, the author gives his opinion on how these scholars neglect the extent to which constitution can fail in the regard that constitutional arrangements benefit sovereigns limiting their powers

All this passage is about is the paradox of sovereign omnipotence and how the conventional view regarding the solution to sovereign omnipotence came about. Also, it concludes with the author’s opinion saying that conventional view fails to account that the solution can fail.

Sajjad1994 · Answer

7. Suppose the Parliament in England makes a commitment to become a permanent member of a multinational body. It can be inferred from the passage that

Explanation

Look for the answer in the last two paragraphs, where Parliament is introduced and discussed. The author establishes two main claims about Parliament: first, that Parliament ended the practical problems of the paradox of omnipotence in the seventeenth century through its respect for property rights, and second, that Parliament is the new locus of the paradox, since Parliament cannot theoretically limit its own actions through a promise. Look for an answer that is supported by one or more of these facts.

A.  There is no clear link between this commitment and obtaining credit.

B.  There is nothing in the passage that can prove this claim. As far as we know, creditors are already confident that Parliament will honor debts, not because of membership in an organization, but because it represents commercial interests.

C.  The author is explicit in the last paragraph that Parliament lacks the power to bind itself by a promise. So this needs to be true.

D.  The passage establishes that commercial interests support repayment of debt, but it allows us to make no inferences about commercial interests’ opinion of international organizations.

E.  This is explicitly rejected by the author, who sees no legal restrictions on Parliament in the last paragraph.

Answer: C

Sajjad1994 · Answer

5. According to the passage, which one of the following was a consequence of the absence of limitations on the legal power of English and French monarchs in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries?

Explanation

Look to the fourth paragraph for the answer to this: This paragraph covers the period from  “the outset of the seventeenth century”  until the Glorious Revolution in 1688. Look for a  “consequence of the absence of limitations.”  Some key phrases help you parse this paragraph:  “not surprisingly”  and  “consequently”  indicate that the higher interest rates were the effect of the lack of limitations on sovereign power. The paragraph also tells us that the monarchs needed the money to  “expand their empires.”  This need for expansion is set against the  “however”  of not repaying debts. So it is
clear that the lack of limitations on power created problems for monarchs trying to expand their empires. Look for one of these consequences in the answer choices.

A.  This is well supported by the fourth paragraph.

B.  There is no evidence for this in the passage.

C.  While wealthy subjects paid lower interest rates than kings paid, there is no evidence for this in the passage.

D.  This is quite plausible, but there is no evidence for this in the passage.

E.  While this would make sense, the passage indicates that limitations began only when there was a revolution. There is no evidence that monarchs started to respect property rights on their own in the passage. 
 
  Answer: A

Sajjad1994 · Answer

6. The author mentions the English and French monarchies’ need for capital (   Highlighted   ) primarily in order to

Explanation

Questions that use the phrase  “primarily in order to”  are asking not what a particular phrase means, but why it is used in the passage. To answer a question like this, look for context. Why is there detail about financing an empire in paragraph 4? That detail will help serve the function of paragraph 4. Since that paragraph primarily establishes the problem of unlimited sovereign power in the seventeenth century, the detail about why monarchs needed money helps the reader understand the effect of the lack of restrictions on the monarch’s power. Look for an answer that explains why the author would put this detail in the paragraph, not for an answer that reiterates or comments on the line itself.

A.  This is the opposite of the author’s goal in the paragraph, which is to establish a problem with a lack of limitations.

B.  The need to finance the empire combined with the low level of trust from creditors created a problem for the monarchs. However, the need for money is not itself an illustration of how creditors felt.

C.  The author has already established as a fact that the sovereign has unlimited legal power. This paragraph attempts to explain the problem with that.

D.  This fits with the author’s goal in the paragraph, which is to establish that the limits on sovereign power created problems for the sovereign.

E.  The author has already established that the sovereign can break commitments. So this paragraph aims to establish the problems with this, not reinforce an idea that has already been proven. 
 
  Answer: D

Can a sovereign have unlimited legal power? If a sovereign does have u

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Can a sovereign have unlimited legal power? If a sovereign does have u

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