Can a sovereign have unlimited legal power? If a sovereign does have unlimited legal power, then the sovereign presumably has the legal power to limit or even completely abdicate its own legal power. But doing so would mean that the sovereign no longer has unlimited legal power, thereby contradicting the initial supposition. This theoretical conundrum is traditionally known as the paradox of omnipotence.
Social scientists have recognized that sovereign omnipotence can be a source of considerable practical difficulty for sovereigns themselves. Douglass North and Barry Weingast show that English and French monarchies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries confronted a practical challenge created by the paradox of their own omnipotence.
North and Weingast point out that it is often in a sovereign’s best interest to make a credible commitment not to perform certain acts. For example, a sovereign with absolute power can refuse to honor its financial commitments. Yet creditors will not voluntarily lend generous amounts at favorable terms to an absolute monarch who can renege upon debts at will.
In the struggle to expand their empires, the English and French monarchies required vast amounts of capital. At the outset of the seventeenth century, however, neither regime could credibly commit itself to repay debts or to honor property rights. The absence of limitations upon the legal power of monarchs meant that there was no law or commitment monarchs could make that they could not also unmake or disregard. Consequently, these monarchs earned a reputation for expropriating wealth, repudiating debts, and reneging upon commitments. Not surprisingly, creditors took such behavior into account and demanded higher interest rates from monarchs than from the monarchs’ wealthy subjects.
North and Weingast argue that the constitutional settlement imposed in England by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 halted such faithless conduct. Henceforth, Parliament controlled the Crown’s purse strings. Parliament, in turn, represented commercial interests that would not tolerate governmental disregard for property rights. The Crown’s newfound inability to dishonor its commitments translated into a newfound ability to borrow: the Crown’s borrowing increased and interest rates fell, because lenders concluded that the Crown would honor its debts.
Thanks to North, Weingast, and others writing in the same vein, it is now conventional to hold that constitutional arrangements benefit sovereigns by limiting their power. But such scholars neglect the extent to which constitutions can fail in this regard. For example, the constitutional settlement imposed by the Glorious Revolution did not solve the paradox of omnipotence but just relocated the problem from one branch of government to another: whereas it was once the Crown that lacked the power to bind itself, it is now Parliament that lacks this power. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a pillar of England’s unwritten constitution, and it provides that Parliament lacks legal power over the extent of its own legal power.
1. Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?(A) The paradox of omnipotence poses a practical problem for governments, which is not necessarily solved by constitutional arrangements.
(B) Abstract theoretical paradoxes often have practical analogues in the political sphere.
(C) The paradox of omnipotence ceased to be an acute practical problem for English monarchs after the Glorious Revolution.
(D) Contrary to what many social scientists believe, the Glorious Revolution did not solve the practical problem of sovereign omnipotence faced by English monarchs.
(E) The supposition that a sovereign has unlimited legal power leads to a logical contradiction.
2. The passage most strongly supports the claim that creditors in England and France in the years before 1688 held which one of the following views about wealthy subjects in those countries?(A) They did not contribute their fair share to the cost of expanding the empires.
(B) They focused on short-term gains at the expense of their own credibility.
(C) They were trying to establish a government that would respect property rights.
(D) They clearly understood the paradox of sovereign omnipotence.
(E) They were more likely than their monarchs to honor financial commitments.
3. Based on the passage, which one of the following considerations would be most important for an English creditor after the Glorious Revolution who is deciding whether to lend money to the Crown at a relatively low interest rate?(A) whether most members of Parliament are aware of the paradox of sovereign omnipotence
(B) whether Parliament can be depended on to adequately represent commercial interests
(C) when the most recent Parliamentary elections were held
(D) how many new laws Parliament has enacted in the past year
(E) whether the Crown’s borrowing has increased in recent years
4. Which one of the following principles underlies the author’s argument in the last paragraph of the passage?(A) The adequacy of a solution to a political problem should be judged in terms of practical consequences rather than theoretical considerations.
(B) A genuine solution to a political problem must eliminate the problem’s fundamental cause rather than just its effects.
(C) A problem inherent in a certain form of government can be solved only if that form of government is completely abandoned.
(D) In terms of practical consequences, it is preferable for unlimited legal power to rest with an elected body rather than an unelected monarch.
(E) A country’s constitution should explicitly specify the powers of each branch of government.
5. According to the passage, which one of the following was a consequence of the absence of limitations on the legal power of English and French monarchs in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries?(A) It was difficult for those monarchs to finance the expansion of their empires.
(B) Those monarchs enacted new laws to specify the obligations of creditors.
(C) It became increasingly easy for wealthy subjects in England and France to borrow money.
(D) Those monarchs borrowed more money than they would have if their power had been restricted.
(E) Those monarchs were forced to demonstrate a willingness to respect property rights.
6. The author mentions the English and French monarchies’ need for capital (Highlighted) primarily in order to(A) cast doubt on the claim that it is in a sovereign’s interest to make a commitment not to perform certain acts
(B) illustrate the low opinion that creditors had of monarchs
(C) emphasize the unlimited nature of the legal power of monarchs
(D) help explain why the paradox of omnipotence was an acute practical problem for those monarchies
(E) reinforce the claim that sovereigns have historically broken their commitments for short- term gain
7. Suppose the Parliament in England makes a commitment to become a permanent member of a multinational body. It can be inferred from the passage that(A) the commitment will undermine Parliament’s ability to obtain credit on favorable terms
(B) lenders will become more confident that Parliament will honor its debts
(C) Parliament has the legal authority to end the commitment at any time
(D) the commercial interests represented by Parliament will disapprove of the commitment
(E) the commitment will increase Parliament’s legal power
8. Which one of the following claims would be accepted by North and Weingast but not by the author of the passage?(A) After 1688, commercial interests in England trusted Parliament to protect their property rights.
(B) The paradox of omnipotence is no longer a practical problem for any actual government.
(C) In England, the Crown was able to borrow money at lower interest rates after the Glorious Revolution than before.
(D) In the seventeenth century, English and French monarchs had a reputation for failing to uphold financial commitments.
(E) The constitutional settlement imposed by the Glorious Revolution solved the problem of sovereign omnipotence.