Computers have long been utilized in the sphere
of law in the form of word processors, spreadsheets,
legal research systems, and practice management
systems. Most exciting, however, has been the
(5) prospect of using artificial intelligence techniques to
create so-called legal reasoning systems—computer
programs that can help to resolve legal disputes by
reasoning from and applying the law. But the
practical benefits of such automated reasoning
(10) systems have fallen short of optimistic early
predictions and have not resulted in computer systems
that can independently provide expert advice about
substantive law. This is not surprising in light of the
difficulty in resolving problems involving the
(15) meaning and applicability of rules set out in a legal
text.
Early attempts at automated legal reasoning
focused on the doctrinal nature of law. They viewed
law as a set of rules, and the resulting computer systems
(20) were engineered to make legal decisions by deter-
mining the consequences that followed when its stored set
of legal rules was applied to a collection of evidentiary
data. Such systems underestimated the problems of
interpretation that can arise at every stage of a legal
(25) argument. Examples abound of situations that are
open to differing interpretations: whether a mobile home in
a trailer park is a house or a motor vehicle, whether a
couple can be regarded as married in the absence of a
formal legal ceremony, and so on. Indeed, many notions
(30) invoked in the text of a statute may be deliberately
left undefined so as to allow the law to be adapted to
unforeseen circumstances. But in order to be able to
apply legal rules to novel situations, systems have to be
equipped with a kind of comprehensive knowledge of
(35) the world that is far beyond their capabilities at
present or in the foreseeable future.
Proponents of legal reasoning systems now argue
that accommodating reference to, and reasoning from,
cases improves the chances of producing a successful
(40) system. By focusing on the practice of reasoning
from precedents, researchers have designed systems
called case-based reasoners, which store individual
example cases in their knowledge bases. In contrast
to a system that models legal knowledge based on a
(45) set of rules, a case-based reasoner, when given a
concrete problem, manipulates the cases in its
knowledge base to reach a conclusion based on a
similar case. Unfortunately, in the case-based systems
currently in development, the criteria for similarity
(50) among cases are system dependent and fixed by the
designer, so that similarity is found only by testing
for the presence or absence of predefined factors.
This simply postpones the apparently intractable
problem of developing a system that can discover for
(55) itself the factors that make cases similar in relevant
ways.
1. Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?(A) Attempts to model legal reasoning through computer programs have not been successful because of problems of interpreting legal discourse and identifying appropriate precedents.
(B) Despite signs of early promise, it is now apparent that computer programs have little value for legal professionals in their work.
(C) Case-based computer systems are vastly superior to those computer systems based upon the doctrinal nature of the law.
(D) Computers applying artificial intelligence techniques show promise for revolutionizing the process of legal interpretation in the relatively near future.
(E) Using computers can expedite legal research, facilitate the matching of a particular case to a specific legal principle, and even provide insights into possible flaws involving legal reasoning.
2. The logical relationship of lines 8–13 of the passage to lines 23–25 and 49–53 of the passage is most accurately described as(A) a general assertion supported by two specific observations
(B) a general assertion followed by two arguments, one of which supports and one of which refutes the general assertion
(C) a general assertion that entails two more specific assertions
(D) a theoretical assumption refuted by two specific observations
(E) a specific observation that suggests two incompatible generalizations
3. In the passage as a whole, the author is primarily concerned with(A) arguing that computers can fundamentally change how the processes of legal interpretation and reasoning are conducted in the future
(B) indicating that the law has subtle nuances that are not readily dealt with by computerized legal reasoning programs
(C) demonstrating that computers are approaching the point where they can apply legal precedents to current cases
(D) suggesting that, because the law is made by humans, computer programmers must also apply their human intuition when designing legal reasoning systems
(E) defending the use of computers as essential and indispensable components of the modern legal profession
4. The passage suggests that the author would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements about computerized automated legal reasoning systems?(A) These systems have met the original expectations of computer specialists but have fallen short of the needs of legal practitioners.
(B) Progress in research on these systems has been hindered, more because not enough legal documents are accessible by computer than because theoretical problems remain unsolved.
(C) These systems will most likely be used as legal research tools rather than as aids in legal analysis.
(D) Rule systems will likely replace case-based systems over time.
(E) Developing adequate legal reasoning systems would require research breakthroughs by computer specialists.
5. It can be most reasonably inferred from the passage’s discussion of requirements for developing effective automated legal reasoning systems that the author would agree with which one of the following statements?(A) Focusing on the doctrinal nature of law is the fundamental error made by developers of automated legal systems.
(B) Contemporary computers do not have the required memory capability to store enough data to be effective legal reasoning systems.
(C) Questions of interpretation in rule-based legal reasoning systems must be settled by programming more legal rules into the systems.
(D) Legal statutes and reasoning may involve innovative applications that cannot be modeled by a fixed set of rules, cases, or criteria.
(E) As professionals continue to use computers in the sphere of law they will develop the competence to use legal reasoning systems effectively.
6. Based on the passage, which one of the following can be most reasonably inferred concerning case-based reasoners?(A) The major problem in the development of these systems is how to store enough cases in their knowledge bases.
(B) These systems are more useful than rule systems because case-based reasoners are based on a simpler view of legal reasoning.
(C) Adding specific criteria for similarity among cases to existing systems would not overcome an important shortcoming of these systems.
(D) These systems can independently provide expert advice about legal rights and duties in a wide range of cases.
(E) These systems are being designed to attain a much more ambitious goal than had been set for rule systems.
7. Which one of the following is mentioned in the passage as an important characteristic of many statutes that frustrates the application of computerized legal reasoning systems?(A) complexity of syntax
(B) unavailability of relevant precedents
(C) intentional vagueness and adaptability
(D) overly narrow intent
(E) incompatibility with previous statutes
8. The examples of situations that are open to differing interpretations (lines 25–30) function in the passage to(A) substantiate the usefulness of computers in the sphere of law
(B) illustrate a vulnerability of rule systems in computerized legal reasoning
(C) isolate issues that computer systems are in principle incapable of handling
(D) explain how legal rules have been adapted to novel situations
(E) question the value of reasoning from precedents in interpreting legal rules