Proponents of the tangible-object theory of
copyright argue that copyright and similar intellectual
property rights can be explained as logical extensions
of the right to own concrete, tangible objects. This
(5) view depends on the claim that every copyrightable
work can be manifested in some physical form, such as
a manuscript or a videotape. It also accepts the premise
that ownership of an object confers a number of rights
on the owner, who may essentially do whatever he or
(10) she pleases with the object to the extent that this
does not violate other people’s rights. One may, for
example, hide or display the object, copy it, or destroy
it. One may also transfer ownership of it to another.
In creating a new and original object from
(15) materials that one owns, one becomes the owner of
that object and thereby acquires all of the rights that
ownership entails. But if the owner transfers ownership
of the object, the full complement of rights is not
necessarily transferred to the new owner; instead, the
(20) original owner may retain one or more of these rights.
This notion of retained rights is common in many areas
of law; for example, the seller of a piece of land may
retain certain rights to the land in the form of
easements or building restrictions. Applying the notion
(25) of retained rights to the domain of intellectual
property, theorists argue that copyrighting a work secures
official recognition of one’s intention to retain certain rights
to that work. Among the rights typically retained by the
original producer of an object such as a literary
(30) manuscript or a musical score would be the right to
copy the object for profit and the right to use it as a
guide for the production of similar or analogous
things—for example, a public performance of a
musical score.
(35)According to proponents of the tangible-object
theory, its chief advantage is that it justifies intellectual
property rights without recourse to the widely accepted
but problematic supposition that one can own abstract,
intangible things such as ideas. But while this account
(40) seems plausible for copyrightable entities that do, in
fact, have enduring tangible forms, it cannot
accommodate the standard assumption that such
evanescent things as live broadcasts of sporting events
can be copyrighted. More importantly, it does not
(45) acknowledge that in many cases the work of
conceiving ideas is more crucial and more valuable
than that of putting them into tangible form. Suppose
that a poet dictates a new poem to a friend, who writes
it down on paper that the friend has supplied. The
(50) creator of the tangible object in this case is not the
poet but the friend, and there would seem to be no ground
for the poet’s claiming copyright unless the poet can be said
to already own the ideas expressed in the work.
1. Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?(A) Copyright and other intellectual-property rights can be explained as logical extensions of the right to own concrete objects.
(B) Attempts to explain copyright and similar intellectual-property rights purely in terms of rights to ownership of physical objects are ultimately misguided.
(C) Copyrighting a work amounts to securing official recognition of one’s intention to retain certain rights to that work.
(D) Explanations of copyright and other intellectual-property rights in terms of rights to ownership of tangible objects fail to consider the argument that ideas should be allowed to circulate freely.
(E) Under the tangible-object theory of intellectual property, rights of ownership are straightforwardly applicable to both ideas and physical objects.
2. According to the passage, the theory that copyright and other intellectual-property rights can be construed as logical extensions of the right to own concrete, tangible objects depends on the claim that(A) any work entitled to intellectual-property protection can be expressed in physical form
(B) only the original creator of an intellectual work can hold the copyright for that work
(C) the work of putting ideas into tangible form is more crucial and more valuable than the work of conceiving those ideas
(D) in a few cases, it is necessary to recognize the right to own abstract, intangible things
(E) the owner of an item of intellectual property may legally destroy it
3. The passage most directly answers which one of the following questions?(A) Do proponents of the tangible-object theory of intellectual property advocate any changes in existing laws relating to copyright?
(B) Do proponents of the tangible-object theory of intellectual property hold that ownership of anything besides real estate can involve retained rights?
(C) Has the tangible-object theory of intellectual property influenced the ways in which copyright cases or other cases involving issues of intellectual property are decided in the courts?
(D) Does existing copyright law provide protection against unauthorized copying of manuscripts and musical scores in cases in which their creators have not officially applied for copyright protection?
(E) Are there standard procedures governing the transfer of intellectual property that are common to most legal systems?
4. Suppose an inventor describes an innovative idea for an invention to an engineer, who volunteers to draft specifications for a prototype and then produces the prototype using the engineer’s own materials. Which one of the following statements would apply to this case under the tangible-object theory of intellectual property, as the author describes that theory?(A) Only the engineer is entitled to claim the invention as intellectual property.
(B) Only the inventor is entitled to claim the invention as intellectual property.
(C) The inventor and the engineer are equally entitled to claim the invention as intellectual property.
(D) The engineer is entitled to claim the invention as intellectual property, but only if the inventor retains the right to all profits generated by the invention.
(E) The inventor is entitled to claim the invention as intellectual property, but only if the engineer retains the right to all profits generated by the invention.
5. Legal theorists supporting the tangible-object theory of intellectual property are most likely to believe which one of the following?(A) A literary work cannot receive copyright protection unless it exists in an edition produced by an established publisher.
(B) Most legal systems explicitly rely on the tangible-object theory of intellectual property in order to avoid asserting that one can own abstract things.
(C) Copyright protects the right to copy for profit, but not the right to copy for other reasons.
(D) Some works deserving of copyright protection simply cannot be manifested as concrete, tangible objects.
(E) To afford patent protection for inventions, the law need not invoke the notion of inventors’ ownership of abstract ideas.
6. The passage provides the most support for inferring which one of the following statements?(A) In most transactions involving the transfer of non-intellectual property, at least some rights of ownership are retained by the seller.
(B) The notion of retained rights of ownership is currently applied to only those areas of law that do not involve intellectual property.
(C) The idea that ownership of the right to copy an item for profit can be transferred is compatible with a tangible-object theory of intellectual property.
(D) Ownership of intellectual property is sufficiently protected by the provisions that, under many legal systems, apply to ownership of material things such as land.
(E) Protection of computer programs under intellectual-property law is justifiable only if the programs are likely to be used as a guide for the production of similar or analogous programs.
7. It can be inferred that the author of the passage is most likely to believe which one of the following?(A) Theorists who suggest that the notion of retained rights is applicable to intellectual property do not fully understand what it means to transfer ownership of property.
(B) If a work does not exist in a concrete, tangible form, there is no valid theoretical basis for claiming that it should have copyright protection.
(C) Under existing statutes, creators of original tangible works that have intellectual or artistic significance generally do not have the legal right to own the abstract ideas embodied in those works.
(D) An adequate theoretical justification of copyright would likely presuppose that a work’s creator originally owns the ideas embodied in that work.
(E) It is common, but incorrect, to assume that such evanescent things as live broadcasts of sporting events can be copyrighted.