Saint Augustine wrote that to proceed against lies by lying would be l

Passage A

Saint Augustine wrote that to proceed against lies
by lying would be like countering robbery with robbery.
To respond to wrongdoing by emulating it is certainly
at times to accept lower standards.

(5) And yet it has seemed to many that there is indeed
some justification for repaying lies with lies. Such
views go back as far as the kind of justice that demands
an eye for an eye. They appeal to our sense of fairness:
to lie to liars is to give them what they deserve, to
(10) restore an equilibrium they themselves have upset.
Just as bullies forfeit the right not to be interfered
with by others, so liars forfeit the right to be dealt
with honestly.

Two separate moral questions are involved in
(15) this debate. The first asks whether a liar has the same
claim to be told the truth as an honest person. The
second asks whether one is more justified in lying to
a liar than to others.

In order to see this distinction clearly, consider a
(20) person known by all to be a pathological liar but quite
harmless. Surely, as the idea of forfeiture suggests,
the liar would have no cause for complaint if lied to.
But his tall tales would not constitute sufficient reason
to lie to him. For the harm to self, others, and general
(25) trust that can come from the practice of lying has
to be taken into account in weighing how to deal with him,
not merely his personal characteristics.

Passage B

A view derived from Immanuel Kant holds that
when rational beings act immorally toward others,
(30) then, by virtue of their status as rational beings, they
implicitly authorize similar actions as punishment
aimed toward themselves. That is, acting rationally,
one always acts as one would have others act toward
oneself. Consequently, to act toward a person as that
(35) person has acted toward others is to treat that person
as a rational being, that is, as if that person's act is the
product of a rational decision.

From this it might be concluded that we have a
duty to do to offenders what they have done, since
(40) this amounts to according them the respect due
rational beings. But the assertion of a duty to punish
seems excessive, since if this duty to others is
necessary to accord them the respect due rational
beings, then we would have a duty to do to all rational
(45) persons everything-good, bad, or indifferent-that
they do to others. The point is rather that by your acts
and by virtue of your status as a rational being, you
authorize others to do the same to you; you do not
compel them to do so. The Kantian argument leads to
(50) a right rather than a duty. Rational beings cannot
validly object to being treated in the way in which
they treated others. Where there is no valid complaint,
there is no injustice, and where there is no injustice,
others have acted within their rights.

1. Both passages are concerned with answering which one of the following questions?

(A) Can immoral actions be harmless?
(B) Should the same rules apply in evaluating moral wrongs and criminal wrongs?
(C) Is it right to respond to a person's wrongdoing with an action of the same kind?
(D) What is the difference between a duty and a right?
(E) Is it just to treat all wrongdoers as rational beings?

2. Which one of the following considerations is introduced in passage A but not in passage B?

(A) the harm that may result as a consequence of treating people as they treat others
(B) the consequences of not reciprocating another's wrongdoing
(C) the properties an action must have to count as rational
(D) the extent to which people who break moral rules are due respect
(E) instances in which people have been wronged by being treated as they treated others

3. The passages are alike in that each seeks to advance its main argument by

(A) anticipating and refuting the most probable objections to a theory
(B) using an analogy to support its overall claim
(C) focusing on a specific case to illustrate a generalization
(D) suggesting that a view can have unreasonable consequences
(E) offering and defending a new definition for a commonly used term

4. The author of passage A would be most likely to agree with which one of the following statements?

(A) Maintaining a policy of reciprocating wrongdoing fails to accord rational beings the respect that they are due.
(B) People have a duty to respond to even the morally neutral actions of others with actions of the same kind.
(C) It can be unjustified to treat a person in a certain way even though that person has forfeited the right not to be treated in that way.
(D) There is no circumstance in which there is sufficient reason to counter a wrong with a wrong of the same kind.
(E) To restore moral equilibrium, justice will occasionally require that an innocent person forfeit the right to be treated in a certain way.

5. Which one of the following most accurately characterizes the difference between the kind of right referred to in passage A (lines 11-13) and the kind of right referred to in passage B (line 50)?

(A) In passage A, the kind of right referred to is a legal right, whereas in passage B the kind of right referred to is a moral right.
(B) In passage A, the kind of right referred to involves benefits granted by society, whereas in passage B the kind of right referred to involves benefits granted by an individual in a position of authority.
(C) In passage A, the kind of right referred to is an entitlement held by groups of people, whereas in passage B the kind of right referred to is an entitlement held only by individuals.
(D) In passage A, the kind of right referred to is something that cannot be given up, whereas in passage B the kind of right referred to is something that can be lost because of certain actions.
(E) In passage A, the kind of right referred to involves behavior that one is entitled to from others, whereas in passage B the kind of right referred to involves behavior that one is licensed to engage in.

6. Which one of the following, if true, would most help to make the suggestion in passage A that a harmless pathological liar's tall tales would not constitute sufficient reason to lie to him (lines 23-24) compatible with the Kantian argument laid out in the first paragraph of passage B?

(A) Responding to pathological behavior with pathological behavior is irrational.
(B) Rationality cannot be reasonably attributed to pathological behavior.
(C) Pathological liars, if harmless, deserve to be treated as rational beings by others.
(D) Having the right to lie to a pathological liar is not equivalent to having a duty to do so.
(E) To model one's behavior on that of a pathological liar is to lower one's own standards.