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Question 1
B
Be sure to select an answer first to save it in the Error Log before revealing the correct answer (OA)!
Difficulty:
85%
(hard)
Question Stats:
45% (02:57) correct
55%
(02:52) wrong
based on 211
sessions
History
Date
Time
Result
Not Attempted Yet
Question 2
B
Be sure to select an answer first to save it in the Error Log before revealing the correct answer (OA)!
Difficulty:
75%
(hard)
Question Stats:
41% (01:19) correct 59%
(01:12) wrong
based on 265
sessions
History
Date
Time
Result
Not Attempted Yet
Question 3
C
Be sure to select an answer first to save it in the Error Log before revealing the correct answer (OA)!
Difficulty:
85%
(hard)
Question Stats:
38% (01:41) correct 62%
(01:30) wrong
based on 252
sessions
History
Date
Time
Result
Not Attempted Yet
Question 4
B
Be sure to select an answer first to save it in the Error Log before revealing the correct answer (OA)!
Difficulty:
55%
(hard)
Question Stats:
52% (01:22) correct 48%
(01:20) wrong
based on 226
sessions
History
Date
Time
Result
Not Attempted Yet
Question 5
D
Be sure to select an answer first to save it in the Error Log before revealing the correct answer (OA)!
Difficulty:
95%
(hard)
Question Stats:
28% (01:31) correct 72%
(01:06) wrong
based on 217
sessions
History
Date
Time
Result
Not Attempted Yet
Question 6
E
Be sure to select an answer first to save it in the Error Log before revealing the correct answer (OA)!
Difficulty:
55%
(hard)
Question Stats:
48% (01:06) correct 52%
(01:05) wrong
based on 194
sessions
History
Date
Time
Result
Not Attempted Yet
Question 7
E
Be sure to select an answer first to save it in the Error Log before revealing the correct answer (OA)!
Difficulty:
65%
(hard)
Question Stats:
47% (01:20) correct 53%
(01:09) wrong
based on 182
sessions
History
Date
Time
Result
Not Attempted Yet
Question 8
C
Be sure to select an answer first to save it in the Error Log before revealing the correct answer (OA)!
Difficulty:
95%
(hard)
Question Stats:
34% (02:07) correct 66%
(02:09) wrong
based on 157
sessions
History
Date
Time
Result
Not Attempted Yet
Passage A
Some legal theorists reject the notion that judges
must believe what they say in their opinions. They
argue that an emphasis on the need for honesty in
judicial decision making ignores the myriad
(5) institutional considerations that judges must
continuously balance in performing the prudential
functions assigned to them. To argue for rigid
adherence to a norm of sincerity is, they say, naive,
foolhardy, and even dangerously utopian.
(10) There are two ways of defending the principle of
judicial sincerity. The first is to marshal prudential
reasons that support the principle. If it can be shown
that following a general rule favoring sincerity
produces the most prudential outcomes—whatever
(15) those happen to be—then the rule is justified.
Accordingly, proponents of greater candor in the
courts have argued, for example, that transparent
decision making provides better guidance to lower
courts and litigants, or that it strengthens the
(20) institutional legitimacy of the courts.
The problem with a prudential defense of judicial
candor is that it fails to acknowledge the normative
force behind the idea that judges should not lie or
deliberately mislead in their opinions. In our ordinary
(25) moral thinking, duties of truth telling are not justified
merely when they produce good outcomes. Rather, the
duty to speak truthfully and openly is an independent
constraint on our actions. This suggests a second way
to defend the principle of judicial sincerity, namely,
(30) by appealing to moral principles rather than
prudential considerations.
Passage B
The requirement that judges give reasons for their
decisions—reasons that can be debated, attacked, and
defended—serves a vital function in constraining the
(35) judiciary's exercise of power. But must judges actually
believe the reasons they give? There are reasons to
think so.
In the absence of any obligation to be candid, the
constraints on judges' powers would be greatly
(40) diluted, since judges who are free to distort or
misstate the reasons for their actions can avoid the
sanctions of criticism and condemnation that honest
disclosure of their motivation may entail. In a sense,
candor is an essential prerequisite of all other restraints
(45) on abuse of judicial power, for the limitations imposed
by constitutions, statutes, and precedents count for
little if judges feel free to believe one thing and say
another. Moreover, lack of candor is likely to be
detectable, and its detection would only serve to
(50) increase public cynicism about the judicial system.
Do these points demonstrate that candor is an
unshakable obligation of judicial behavior? Do they
rebut the argument that judicial deception is warranted
in cases where it yields some net benefit? Probably
(55) not. But they do suggest that any cost-benefit calculus
must take account of the large institutional losses that
would result from a lack of trust in the honesty of judges
and from an inability to debate and criticize the true
reasons for their decisions. These points suffice to
(60) show that there is a strong presumption in favor of
judicial candor.
Some legal theorists reject the notion that judges
must believe what they say in their opinions. They
argue that an emphasis on the need for honesty in
judicial decision making ignores the myriad
(5) institutional considerations that judges must
continuously balance in performing the prudential
functions assigned to them. To argue for rigid
adherence to a norm of sincerity is, they say, naive,
foolhardy, and even dangerously utopian.
(10) There are two ways of defending the principle of
judicial sincerity. The first is to marshal prudential
reasons that support the principle. If it can be shown
that following a general rule favoring sincerity
produces the most prudential outcomes—whatever
(15) those happen to be—then the rule is justified.
Accordingly, proponents of greater candor in the
courts have argued, for example, that transparent
decision making provides better guidance to lower
courts and litigants, or that it strengthens the
(20) institutional legitimacy of the courts.
The problem with a prudential defense of judicial
candor is that it fails to acknowledge the normative
force behind the idea that judges should not lie or
deliberately mislead in their opinions. In our ordinary
(25) moral thinking, duties of truth telling are not justified
merely when they produce good outcomes. Rather, the
duty to speak truthfully and openly is an independent
constraint on our actions. This suggests a second way
to defend the principle of judicial sincerity, namely,
(30) by appealing to moral principles rather than
prudential considerations.
Passage B
The requirement that judges give reasons for their
decisions—reasons that can be debated, attacked, and
defended—serves a vital function in constraining the
(35) judiciary's exercise of power. But must judges actually
believe the reasons they give? There are reasons to
think so.
In the absence of any obligation to be candid, the
constraints on judges' powers would be greatly
(40) diluted, since judges who are free to distort or
misstate the reasons for their actions can avoid the
sanctions of criticism and condemnation that honest
disclosure of their motivation may entail. In a sense,
candor is an essential prerequisite of all other restraints
(45) on abuse of judicial power, for the limitations imposed
by constitutions, statutes, and precedents count for
little if judges feel free to believe one thing and say
another. Moreover, lack of candor is likely to be
detectable, and its detection would only serve to
(50) increase public cynicism about the judicial system.
Do these points demonstrate that candor is an
unshakable obligation of judicial behavior? Do they
rebut the argument that judicial deception is warranted
in cases where it yields some net benefit? Probably
(55) not. But they do suggest that any cost-benefit calculus
must take account of the large institutional losses that
would result from a lack of trust in the honesty of judges
and from an inability to debate and criticize the true
reasons for their decisions. These points suffice to
(60) show that there is a strong presumption in favor of
judicial candor.
1. Both passages seek an answer to which one of the following questions?
(A) Should constraints on judges' powers be strengthened?
(B) Must judges believe what they say in their opinions?
(C) Is judicial candor required for the institutional legitimacy of the courts?
(D) Does judicial decision making need to be transparent in order to be of use to litigants?
(E) Do the costs of judicial candor outweigh the benefits?
(A) Should constraints on judges' powers be strengthened?
(B) Must judges believe what they say in their opinions?
(C) Is judicial candor required for the institutional legitimacy of the courts?
(D) Does judicial decision making need to be transparent in order to be of use to litigants?
(E) Do the costs of judicial candor outweigh the benefits?
2. Both passages allude to the possibility that a lack of judicial candor might affect which one of the following?
(A) public compliance with controversial judgments
(B) the institutional strength of the courts
(C) the ability to debate and criticize judicial rulings
(D) the guidance provided to lower courts
(E) the limitations imposed on judges by constitutions
(A) public compliance with controversial judgments
(B) the institutional strength of the courts
(C) the ability to debate and criticize judicial rulings
(D) the guidance provided to lower courts
(E) the limitations imposed on judges by constitutions
3. The authors would be most likely to disagree over whether
(A) a judge's believing some, but not all, of the reasons given when issuing a judicial decision qualifies as a violation of the principle of judicial candor
(B) public debate of judicial decisions is necessary for the proper functioning of the judiciary
(C) the judicial duty to be candid is justified regardless of whether following that duty produces good outcomes
(D) in nonlegal settings, individuals have an unshakable duty to tell the truth
(E) when considering a possible course of action, it is usually a relatively easy task to weigh the costs and benefits associated with that action
(A) a judge's believing some, but not all, of the reasons given when issuing a judicial decision qualifies as a violation of the principle of judicial candor
(B) public debate of judicial decisions is necessary for the proper functioning of the judiciary
(C) the judicial duty to be candid is justified regardless of whether following that duty produces good outcomes
(D) in nonlegal settings, individuals have an unshakable duty to tell the truth
(E) when considering a possible course of action, it is usually a relatively easy task to weigh the costs and benefits associated with that action
4. Which one of the following principles underlies the argument in passage A, but not that in passage B?
(A) Judicial decisions should be subject to public debate and criticism.
(B) Moral considerations should be given significant weight in the standards and practices of the judiciary.
(C) Judicial obligations should not be rigidly adhered to if doing so is unrealistic or impractical.
(D) Judges should not conduct cost-benefit analyses when deciding cases of great importance.
(E) Prudential reasons that support a principle should not be given greater weight than prudential reasons that oppose that principle.
(A) Judicial decisions should be subject to public debate and criticism.
(B) Moral considerations should be given significant weight in the standards and practices of the judiciary.
(C) Judicial obligations should not be rigidly adhered to if doing so is unrealistic or impractical.
(D) Judges should not conduct cost-benefit analyses when deciding cases of great importance.
(E) Prudential reasons that support a principle should not be given greater weight than prudential reasons that oppose that principle.
5. Each author implies that a lack of judicial candor
(A) violates an unshakable rule of judicial behavior
(B) provides litigants with insufficient guidance
(C) is an unavoidable product of the conflicting demands placed on judges
(D) could conceivably have positive benefits under certain circumstances
(E) is likely to be detected if it continues over a sufficient length of time
(A) violates an unshakable rule of judicial behavior
(B) provides litigants with insufficient guidance
(C) is an unavoidable product of the conflicting demands placed on judges
(D) could conceivably have positive benefits under certain circumstances
(E) is likely to be detected if it continues over a sufficient length of time
6. Which one of the following is mentioned in passage B, but not passage A?
(A) the institutional considerations balanced by judges
(B) the possibility that judicial deception is largely unintentional
(C) the need for transparency in judicial decision making
(D) the role of judicial candor in providing guidance to litigants
(E) restraints on judicial abuse of power
(A) the institutional considerations balanced by judges
(B) the possibility that judicial deception is largely unintentional
(C) the need for transparency in judicial decision making
(D) the role of judicial candor in providing guidance to litigants
(E) restraints on judicial abuse of power
7. The authors would be most likely to disagree over whether
(A) the institutional legitimacy of the courts depends on people having trust in the honesty of judges
(B) the opportunity to debate judicial decisions serves to constrain the judiciary's exercise of power
(C) judges must balance a number of considerations when performing the functions assigned to them
(D) prudential considerations are relevant to determining the proper course of action in some nonlegal situations
(E) it is correct to view judicial candor as an obligation that can be overruled in certain circumstances
(A) the institutional legitimacy of the courts depends on people having trust in the honesty of judges
(B) the opportunity to debate judicial decisions serves to constrain the judiciary's exercise of power
(C) judges must balance a number of considerations when performing the functions assigned to them
(D) prudential considerations are relevant to determining the proper course of action in some nonlegal situations
(E) it is correct to view judicial candor as an obligation that can be overruled in certain circumstances
8. Which one of the following is most analogous to the claim regarding judicial candor made in the second sentence of the second paragraph of passage B?
(A) Juries must be selected from as representative a selection of the population as possible. Otherwise, their verdicts cannot be trusted to be unbiased.
(B) Artists often complain that commercial demands force constraints upon their art. However, many of the greatest works of art have been created by artists working within very restrictive constraints.
(C) The data presented in support of a scientific theory must meet conditions such as relevance and sufficiency. But a presumption of all such conditions is that the data itself is accurate.
(D) In certain competitive activities, competitors can gain an advantage by deceiving their opponents. As long as the deception does not violate the rules of the competition, it is not considered unethical, but is instead considered to be part of the competition.
(E) In many cases, a doctor may determine that a patient is not at any significant risk for suffering side effects from a prescribed medication. However, even in such cases doctors have a professional obligation to fully and honestly discuss all possible side effects.
(A) Juries must be selected from as representative a selection of the population as possible. Otherwise, their verdicts cannot be trusted to be unbiased.
(B) Artists often complain that commercial demands force constraints upon their art. However, many of the greatest works of art have been created by artists working within very restrictive constraints.
(C) The data presented in support of a scientific theory must meet conditions such as relevance and sufficiency. But a presumption of all such conditions is that the data itself is accurate.
(D) In certain competitive activities, competitors can gain an advantage by deceiving their opponents. As long as the deception does not violate the rules of the competition, it is not considered unethical, but is instead considered to be part of the competition.
(E) In many cases, a doctor may determine that a patient is not at any significant risk for suffering side effects from a prescribed medication. However, even in such cases doctors have a professional obligation to fully and honestly discuss all possible side effects.
31 Aug 2024, 06:34
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This shouldn't belong here. This type is for LSAT alone & NOT FOR GMAT
