Feminist legal theory manifests through writing and speaking about ‘law’ and ‘women,’ in an effort to promote and improve understanding about justice. In its life span, it has gone through several evolutions, to produce a plural, complex, and fractured body of thought and practice. Developments in feminist legal theory have emerged through engagement with problems connected to inequalities, as experienced by individuals and communities at the hands of people, corporations, or the state. The problem-driven impetus of feminist legal theory contributes to its present-day heterogeneity.
The separation line between feminism and feminist legal theory is porous. While feminist legal theory takes law as a primary focus, the whole field of feminist studies regularly engages legal issues because the state is central to feminism's reformist agenda. Contemporary Western feminism's roots lie in nineteenth-century campaigns to abolish slavery and secure the right to vote for women and enslaved people. Although some US campaigners fought to end both slavery and women's oppression, the post-Civil War movement for women's suffrage splintered over decisions to prioritize the voting rights of white middle-class women.
As an intellectual and political enterprise, feminist legal theory has been a movement embedded in the political currents of its time. The twentieth-century's struggle between liberalism and Marxism set the stage for feminist debates about prioritizing civil equality rights over material inequalities. The contemporary rollback of the welfare state, the foregrounding of the nuclear family as the caretaker of human vulnerability, and the disproportionate impact of austerity policies on marginalized women provide the context for the critical attention among feminist legal theorists to issues such as the feminization of the global care market.
It was not until the 1970s that ‘feminist legal theory’ came to be labeled as a field. The equality stage of feminist legal theory, sometimes labeled ‘liberal feminism’ and dated to the 1970s, focused on formal inequalities between women and men and called for ending legal discrimination. By the 1980s, radical or dominance feminism and difference feminism shifted attention to the differences between women and men and the social production of inequality. Both schools of thought were criticized for single-minded attention to the concerns of class- and race-privileged women.
Which of the following, if true, would most weaken the claim that the equality stage of feminist legal theory focused solely on formal inequalities between men and women?
A. Records show that feminist legal theorists during this stage focused on repealing laws that discriminated against women in employment and education.
B. A legal scholar from the equality stage argued that legal changes in voting rights would lead to wider societal acceptance of women's rights.
C. Feminist legal theorists from this stage successfully pushed for anti-discrimination laws in the workforce that applied equally to men and women.
D. Legal reforms during the equality stage were primarily aimed at securing formal legal rights for women, such as property ownership and voting.
E. Documents from this stage reveal that feminist legal theorists also addressed economic inequalities, such as the wage gap and access to resources for low-income women.