In Canadian and United States common law, blackmail is unique among ma

The following passages are adapted from articles recently published in North American law review journals.

Passage A

In Canadian and United States common law,
blackmail is unique among major crimes: no one has
yet adequately explained why it ought to be illegal.
The heart of the problem—known as the blackmail
(5) paradox—is that two acts, each of which is legally
permissible separately, become illegal when combined.
If I threaten to expose a criminal act or embarrassing
private information unless I am paid money, I have
committed blackmail. But the right to free speech
(10) protects my right to make such a disclosure, and, in
many circumstances, I have a legal right to seek
money. So why is it illegal to combine them?

The lack of a successful theory of blackmail has
damaging consequences: drawing a clear line between
(15) legal and illegal acts has proved impossible without
one. Consequently, most blackmail statutes broadly
prohibit behavior that no one really believes is criminal
and rely on the good judgment of prosecutors not to
enforce relevant statutes precisely as written.

(20) It is possible, however, to articulate a coherent
theory of blackmail. The key to the wrongness of the
blackmail transaction is its triangular structure. The
blackmailer obtains what he wants by using a
supplementary leverage, leverage that depends upon
(25) a third party. The blackmail victim pays to avoid
being harmed by persons other than the blackmailer.
For example, when a blackmailer threatens to turn in
a criminal unless paid money, the blackmailer is
bargaining with the state’s chip. Thus, blackmail is
(30) criminal because it involves the misuse of a third party
for the blackmailer’s own benefit.

Passage B

Classical Roman law had no special category
for blackmail; it was not necessary. Roman jurists
began their evaluation of specific categories of
(35) actions by considering whether the action caused
harm, not by considering the legality or illegality of
the action itself.

Their assumption—true enough, it seems—was
that a victim of blackmail would be harmed if shameful
(40) but private information were revealed to the world.
And if the shame would cause harm to the person’s
status or reputation, then prima facie the threatened
act of revelation was unlawful. The burden of proof
shifted to the possessor of the information: the party
(45) who had or threatened to reveal shameful facts had
to show positive cause for the privilege of revealing
the information.

In short, assertion of the truth of the shameful
fact being revealed was not, in itself, sufficient to
(50) constitute a legal privilege. Granted, truth was not
wholly irrelevant; false disclosures were granted even
less protection than true ones. But even if it were true,
the revelation of shameful information was protected
only if the revelation had been made for a legitimate
(55) purpose and dealt with a matter that the public
authorities had an interest in having revealed. Just
because something shameful happened to be true did
not mean it was lawful to reveal it.

1. Which one of the following is the central topic of each passage?

(A) why triangular transactions are illegal
(B) the role of the right to free speech in a given legal system
(C) how blackmail has been handled in a given legal system
(D) the history of blackmail as a legal concept
(E) why no good explanation of the illegality of blackmail exists


2. In using the phrase “the state’s chip” (line 30), the author of passage A most clearly means to refer to a government’s

(A) legal authority to determine what actions are crimes
(B) legitimate interest in learning about crimes committed in its jurisdiction
(C) legitimate interest in preventing crimes before they occur
(D) exclusive reliance on private citizens as a source of important information
(E) legal ability to compel its citizens to testify in court regarding crimes they have witnessed


3. Which one of the following statements is most strongly supported by information given in the passages?

(A) In Roman law, there was no blackmail paradox because free speech protections comparable to those in Canadian and U.S. common law were not an issue.
(B) Blackmail was more widely practiced in Roman antiquity than it is now because Roman law did not specifically prohibit blackmail.
(C) In general, Canadian and U.S. common law grant more freedoms than classical Roman law granted.
(D) The best justification for the illegality of blackmail in Canadian and U.S. common law is the damage blackmail can cause to the victim’s reputation.
(E) Unlike Roman law, Canadian and U.S. common law do not recognize the interest of public authorities in having certain types of information revealed.


4. Which one of the following is a statement that is true of blackmail under Canadian and U.S. common law, according to passage A, but that would not have been true of blackmail in the Roman legal context, according to passage B?

(A) It combines two acts that are each legal separately.
(B) It is a transaction with a triangular structure.
(C) The laws pertaining to it are meant to be enforced precisely as written.
(D) The blackmail victim pays to avoid being harmed by persons other than the blackmailer.
(E) Canadian and U.S. common law have no special category pertaining to blackmail.


5. Based on what can be inferred from the passages, which one of the following acts would have been illegal under Roman law, but would not be illegal under Canadian and U.S. common law?

(A) bribing tax officials in order to avoid paying taxes
(B) revealing to public authorities that a highranking military officer has embezzled funds from the military’s budget
(C) testifying in court to a defendant’s innocence while knowing that the defendant is guilty
(D) informing a government tax agency that one’s employers have concealed their true income
(E) revealing to the public that a prominent politician had once had an adulterous affair


6. The relationship between the ways in which Canadian and U.S. common law and classical Roman law treat blackmail, as described in the passages, is most analogous to the relationship between which one of the following pairs?

(A) One country legally requires anyone working as a carpenter to be licensed and insured; another country has no such requirement.
(B) One country makes it illegal to use cell phones on trains; another country makes it illegal to use cell phones on both trains and buses.
(C) One country legally allows many income tax deductions and exemptions; another country legally allows relatively few deductions and exemptions.
(D) One country makes it illegal for felons to own guns; another country has no such ban because it makes gun ownership illegal for everyone but police and the military.
(E) One country makes it illegal to drive motorcycles with racing-grade engines on its roads; another country legally permits such motorcycles but fines riders who commit traffic violations higher amounts than it does other motorists.