One approach to the question of which objects discussed by a science are real is to designate as real all and only those entities posited by the most explanatorily powerful theory of the science. But since most scientific theories contain entities posited solely on theoretical grounds, this approach is flawed.
Argument: About response to a question about which objects discussed by science are real? The answer is "those entities posited by the most powerful theory of science".
Conclusion: Approach to consider entities real on above mentioned grounds is flawed
Reasoning: Most scientific theories contain entities posited solely on theoretical groundsWhich one of the following principles, if valid, most helps to justify the reasoning above?
Question stem: most helps to justify the reasoning above(A) Any object that is posited by a scientific theory and that enhances the explanatory power of that theory should be designated as real.
//Incorrect.. no support for posits enhancing the power of a theory in the reasoning, out of scope(B) Objects posited for theoretical reasons only should never be designated as real.
//Correct.. Says the same thing what the reasoning says(C) A scientific theory should not posit any entity that does no enhance the explanatory power of the theory.
//This option talks about basis of considering an object real or not in a theory not the other way round, doesnt help the cause.(D) A scientific theory should sometimes posit entities on grounds other than theoretical ones.
//Same as option (C)(E) Only objects posited by explanatorily powerful theories should be designated as real.
//This weakens the reasoningKudos

if helpful