Events & Promotions
|
|
GMAT Club Daily Prep
Thank you for using the timer - this advanced tool can estimate your performance and suggest more practice questions. We have subscribed you to Daily Prep Questions via email.
Customized
for You
Track
Your Progress
Practice
Pays
Not interested in getting valuable practice questions and articles delivered to your email? No problem, unsubscribe here.
Nov 2007:30 AM PST
-08:30 AM PST
Learn what truly sets the UC Riverside MBA apart and how it helps in your professional growth
Nov 2211:00 AM IST
-01:00 PM IST
Do RC/MSR passages scare you? e-GMAT is conducting a masterclass to help you learn – Learn effective reading strategies Tackle difficult RC & MSR with confidence Excel in timed test environment- Nov 23
11:00 AM IST
-01:00 PM IST
Attend this free GMAT Algebra Webinar and learn how to master the most challenging Inequalities and Absolute Value problems with ease. 
Nov 2510:00 AM EST
-11:00 AM EST
Prefer video-based learning? The Target Test Prep OnDemand course is a one-of-a-kind video masterclass featuring 400 hours of lecture-style teaching by Scott Woodbury-Stewart, founder of Target Test Prep and one of the most accomplished GMAT instructors.
lahoosaher
Joined: 16 Jan 2009
Last visit: 20 Apr 2018
Posts: 236
Given Kudos: 16
Concentration: Technology, Marketing
Schools: Ross '16 (D) Tepper '16 (D) McCombs '16 (D) ISB '15 (D) Marshall '16 (WL) McDonough '16 (WL) Goizueta '16 (WL) Kelley '16 (D) Kenan-Flagler '16 (D) Rotman '16 (S)
GMAT 1: 700 Q50 V34
GPA: 3
WE:Sales (Telecommunications)
Schools: Ross '16 (D) Tepper '16 (D) McCombs '16 (D) ISB '15 (D) Marshall '16 (WL) McDonough '16 (WL) Goizueta '16 (WL) Kelley '16 (D) Kenan-Flagler '16 (D) Rotman '16 (S)
GMAT 1: 700 Q50 V34
Posts: 236
15 Sep 2009, 11:52
Kudos
Bookmarks
Discussed here
nico-frijda-writes-that-emotions-are-governed-by-a-psychological-princ-113309.html
Nico Frijda writes that emotions are governed by a psychological principle called the “law of apparent reality”: emotions are elicited only by events appraised as real, and the intensity of these emotions corresponds to the degree to which these events are appraised as real. This observation seems psychologically plausible, but emotional responses elicited by works of art raise counterexamples.
Frijda’s law accounts for my panic if I am afraid of snakes and see an object I correctly appraise as a rattlesnake, and also for my identical response if I see a coiled garden hose I mistakenly perceive to be a snake. However, suppose I am watching a movie and see a snake gliding toward its victim. Surely I might experience the same emotions of panic and distress, though I know the snake is not real. These responses extend even to phenomena not conventionally accepted as real. A movie about ghosts, for example, may be terrifying to all viewers, even those who firmly reject the possibility of ghosts, but this is not because viewers are confusing cinematic depiction with reality. Moreover, I can feel strong emotions in response to objects of art that are interpretations, rather than representations, of reality: I am moved by Mozart’s Requiem, but I know that I am not at a real funeral. However, if Frijda’s law is to explain all emotional reactions, there should be no emotional response at all to aesthetic objects or events, because we know they are not real in the way a living rattlesnake is real.
Most psychologists, perplexed by the feelings they acknowledge are aroused by aesthetic experience, have claimed that these emotions are genuine, but different in kind from nonaesthetic emotions. This, however, is a descriptive distinction rather than an empirical observation and consequently lacks explanatory value. On the other hand, Gombrich argues that emotional responses to art are ersatz; art triggers remembrances of previously experienced emotions. These debates have prompted the psychologist Radford to argue that people do experience real melancholy or joy in responding to art, but that these are irrational responses precisely because people know they are reacting to illusory stimuli. Frijda’s law does not help us to untangle these positions, since it simply implies that events we recognize as being represented rather than real cannot elicit emotion in the first place.
Frijda does suggest that a vivid imagination has “properties of reality”—implying, without explanation, that we make aesthetic objects or events “real” in the act of experiencing them. However, as Scruton argues, a necessary characteristic of the imaginative construction that can occur in an emotional response to art is that the person knows he or she is pretending. This is what distinguishes imagination from psychotic fantasy.
1. Which one of the following best states the central idea of the passage?
(A) The law of apparent reality fails to account satisfactorily for the emotional nature of belief.
(B) Theories of aesthetic response fail to account for how we distinguish unreasonable from reasonable responses to art.
(C) The law of apparent reality fails to account satisfactorily for emotional responses to art.
(D) Psychologists have been unable to determine what accounts for the changeable nature of emotional responses to art.
(E) Psychologists have been unable to determine what differentiates aesthetic from nonaesthetic emotional responses.
2. According to the passage, Frijda’s law asserts that emotional responses to events are
(A) unpredictable because emotional responses depend on how aware the person is of the reality of an event
(B) weaker if the person cannot distinguish illusion from reality
(C) more or less intense depending on the degree to which the person perceives the event to be real
(D) more intense if the person perceives an event to be frightening
(E) weaker if the person judges an event to be real but unthreatening
3. The author suggests that Frijda’s notion of the role of imagination in aesthetic response is problematic because it
(A) ignore the unselfconsciousness that is characteristic of emotional responses to art
(B) ignores the distinction between genuine emotion and ersatz emotion
(C) ignores the fact that a person who is imagining knows that he or she is imagining
(D) makes irrelevant distinctions between vivid and weak imaginative capacities
(E) suggests, in reference to the observation of art, that there is no distinction between real and illusory stimuli
4. The passage supports all of the following statements about the differences between Gombrich and Radford EXCEPT:
(A) Radfod’s argument relies on a notion of irrationality in a way that Gomgbrich’s argument does not.
(B) Gmbrich’s position is closer to the position of the majority of psychologists than is Radford’s.
(C) Gombrich, unlike Radford, argues that we do not have true emotions in response to art.
(D) Gombrich’s argument rests on a notion of memory in a way that Radford’s argument does not.
(E) Radford’s argument, unlike Gombrich’s, is not focused on the artificial quality of emotional responses to art.
5. Which one of the following best captures the progression of the author’s argument in lines 9-31?
(A) The emotional responses to events ranging from the real to the depicted illustrate the irrationality of emotional response.
(B) A series of events that range from the real to the depicted conveys the contrast between real events and cinematic depiction.
(C) An intensification in emotional response to a series of events that range from the real to the depicted illustrates Frijda’s law.
(D) A progression of events that range from the real to the depicted examines the precise nature of panic in relation to feared object.
(E) The consistency of emotional responses to events that range from the real to the depicted challenges Frijda’s law.
6. Author’s assertions concerning movies about ghosts imply that all of the following statements are false EXCEPT:
(A) Movies about ghosts are terrifying in proportion to viewers’ beliefs in the phenomenon of ghosts.
(B) Movies about imaginary phenomena like ghosts may be just as terrifying as movies about phenomena like snake.
(C) Movies about ghosts and snakes are not terrifying because people know that what they viewing is not real.
(D) Movies about ghosts are terrifying to viewers who previously rejected the possibility of ghosts because movies permanently alter the viewers sense of reality.
(E) Movies about ghosts elicit a very different emotional response from viewers who do not believe in ghosts than movies about snakes elicit from viewers who are frightened by snakes.
7. Which one of the following statements best exemplifies the position of Radford concerning the nature of emotional response to art?
(A) A person watching a movie about guerrilla warfare irrationally believes that he or she is present at the battle.
(B) A person watching a play about a kidnapping feels nothing because he or she rationally realizes it is not a real event.
(C) A person gets particular enjoyment out of writing fictional narratives in which he or she figures as a main character.
(D) A person irrationally bursts into tears while reading a novel about a destructive fire, even while realizing that he or she is reading about a fictional event.
(E) A person who is afraid of snakes trips over a branch and irrationally panics.
nico-frijda-writes-that-emotions-are-governed-by-a-psychological-princ-113309.html
Nico Frijda writes that emotions are governed by a psychological principle called the “law of apparent reality”: emotions are elicited only by events appraised as real, and the intensity of these emotions corresponds to the degree to which these events are appraised as real. This observation seems psychologically plausible, but emotional responses elicited by works of art raise counterexamples.
Frijda’s law accounts for my panic if I am afraid of snakes and see an object I correctly appraise as a rattlesnake, and also for my identical response if I see a coiled garden hose I mistakenly perceive to be a snake. However, suppose I am watching a movie and see a snake gliding toward its victim. Surely I might experience the same emotions of panic and distress, though I know the snake is not real. These responses extend even to phenomena not conventionally accepted as real. A movie about ghosts, for example, may be terrifying to all viewers, even those who firmly reject the possibility of ghosts, but this is not because viewers are confusing cinematic depiction with reality. Moreover, I can feel strong emotions in response to objects of art that are interpretations, rather than representations, of reality: I am moved by Mozart’s Requiem, but I know that I am not at a real funeral. However, if Frijda’s law is to explain all emotional reactions, there should be no emotional response at all to aesthetic objects or events, because we know they are not real in the way a living rattlesnake is real.
Most psychologists, perplexed by the feelings they acknowledge are aroused by aesthetic experience, have claimed that these emotions are genuine, but different in kind from nonaesthetic emotions. This, however, is a descriptive distinction rather than an empirical observation and consequently lacks explanatory value. On the other hand, Gombrich argues that emotional responses to art are ersatz; art triggers remembrances of previously experienced emotions. These debates have prompted the psychologist Radford to argue that people do experience real melancholy or joy in responding to art, but that these are irrational responses precisely because people know they are reacting to illusory stimuli. Frijda’s law does not help us to untangle these positions, since it simply implies that events we recognize as being represented rather than real cannot elicit emotion in the first place.
Frijda does suggest that a vivid imagination has “properties of reality”—implying, without explanation, that we make aesthetic objects or events “real” in the act of experiencing them. However, as Scruton argues, a necessary characteristic of the imaginative construction that can occur in an emotional response to art is that the person knows he or she is pretending. This is what distinguishes imagination from psychotic fantasy.
1. Which one of the following best states the central idea of the passage?
(A) The law of apparent reality fails to account satisfactorily for the emotional nature of belief.
(B) Theories of aesthetic response fail to account for how we distinguish unreasonable from reasonable responses to art.
(C) The law of apparent reality fails to account satisfactorily for emotional responses to art.
(D) Psychologists have been unable to determine what accounts for the changeable nature of emotional responses to art.
(E) Psychologists have been unable to determine what differentiates aesthetic from nonaesthetic emotional responses.
2. According to the passage, Frijda’s law asserts that emotional responses to events are
(A) unpredictable because emotional responses depend on how aware the person is of the reality of an event
(B) weaker if the person cannot distinguish illusion from reality
(C) more or less intense depending on the degree to which the person perceives the event to be real
(D) more intense if the person perceives an event to be frightening
(E) weaker if the person judges an event to be real but unthreatening
3. The author suggests that Frijda’s notion of the role of imagination in aesthetic response is problematic because it
(A) ignore the unselfconsciousness that is characteristic of emotional responses to art
(B) ignores the distinction between genuine emotion and ersatz emotion
(C) ignores the fact that a person who is imagining knows that he or she is imagining
(D) makes irrelevant distinctions between vivid and weak imaginative capacities
(E) suggests, in reference to the observation of art, that there is no distinction between real and illusory stimuli
4. The passage supports all of the following statements about the differences between Gombrich and Radford EXCEPT:
(A) Radfod’s argument relies on a notion of irrationality in a way that Gomgbrich’s argument does not.
(B) Gmbrich’s position is closer to the position of the majority of psychologists than is Radford’s.
(C) Gombrich, unlike Radford, argues that we do not have true emotions in response to art.
(D) Gombrich’s argument rests on a notion of memory in a way that Radford’s argument does not.
(E) Radford’s argument, unlike Gombrich’s, is not focused on the artificial quality of emotional responses to art.
5. Which one of the following best captures the progression of the author’s argument in lines 9-31?
(A) The emotional responses to events ranging from the real to the depicted illustrate the irrationality of emotional response.
(B) A series of events that range from the real to the depicted conveys the contrast between real events and cinematic depiction.
(C) An intensification in emotional response to a series of events that range from the real to the depicted illustrates Frijda’s law.
(D) A progression of events that range from the real to the depicted examines the precise nature of panic in relation to feared object.
(E) The consistency of emotional responses to events that range from the real to the depicted challenges Frijda’s law.
6. Author’s assertions concerning movies about ghosts imply that all of the following statements are false EXCEPT:
(A) Movies about ghosts are terrifying in proportion to viewers’ beliefs in the phenomenon of ghosts.
(B) Movies about imaginary phenomena like ghosts may be just as terrifying as movies about phenomena like snake.
(C) Movies about ghosts and snakes are not terrifying because people know that what they viewing is not real.
(D) Movies about ghosts are terrifying to viewers who previously rejected the possibility of ghosts because movies permanently alter the viewers sense of reality.
(E) Movies about ghosts elicit a very different emotional response from viewers who do not believe in ghosts than movies about snakes elicit from viewers who are frightened by snakes.
7. Which one of the following statements best exemplifies the position of Radford concerning the nature of emotional response to art?
(A) A person watching a movie about guerrilla warfare irrationally believes that he or she is present at the battle.
(B) A person watching a play about a kidnapping feels nothing because he or she rationally realizes it is not a real event.
(C) A person gets particular enjoyment out of writing fictional narratives in which he or she figures as a main character.
(D) A person irrationally bursts into tears while reading a novel about a destructive fire, even while realizing that he or she is reading about a fictional event.
(E) A person who is afraid of snakes trips over a branch and irrationally panics.
Archived Topic
Hi there,
This topic has been closed and archived due to inactivity or violation of community quality standards. No more replies are possible here.
Where to now? Join ongoing discussions on thousands of quality questions in our Reading Comprehension (RC) Forum
Still interested in this question? Check out the "Best Topics" block below for a better discussion on this exact question, as well as several more related questions.
Thank you for understanding, and happy exploring!
lahoosaher
Joined: 16 Jan 2009
Last visit: 20 Apr 2018
Posts: 236
Own Kudos:
Given Kudos: 16
Concentration: Technology, Marketing
Schools: Ross '16 (D) Tepper '16 (D) McCombs '16 (D) ISB '15 (D) Marshall '16 (WL) McDonough '16 (WL) Goizueta '16 (WL) Kelley '16 (D) Kenan-Flagler '16 (D) Rotman '16 (S)
GMAT 1: 700 Q50 V34
GPA: 3
WE:Sales (Telecommunications)
Schools: Ross '16 (D) Tepper '16 (D) McCombs '16 (D) ISB '15 (D) Marshall '16 (WL) McDonough '16 (WL) Goizueta '16 (WL) Kelley '16 (D) Kenan-Flagler '16 (D) Rotman '16 (S)
GMAT 1: 700 Q50 V34
Posts: 236
Kudos:
1,031
15 Sep 2009, 11:55
Kudos
Bookmarks
My answers:
C
C
E
B
E
B
D
Time to read :3.34 mins
Total time : 14 mins.....what am i doing.....
C
C
E
B
E
B
D
Time to read :3.34 mins
Total time : 14 mins.....what am i doing.....
