spriya wrote:
Biometric access-control systems—those using fingerprints, voice prints, etc., to regulate admittance to restricted areas—work by degrees of similarity, not by identity. After all, even the same finger will rarely leave exactly identical prints. Such systems can be adjusted to minimize refusals of access to legitimate access-seekers. Such adjustments, however, increase the likelihood of admitting impostors.
Which of the following conclusions is most strongly supported by the information above?
(A) If a biometric access-control system were made to work by identity, it would not produce any correct admittance decisions.
(B) If a biometric access-control system reliably prevents impostors from being admitted, it will sometimes turn away legitimate access-seekers.
(C) Biometric access-control systems are appropriate only in situations in which admittance of impostors is less of a problem than is mistaken refusal of access.
(D) Nonbiometric access-control systems—based, for example, on numerical codes—are less likely than biometric ones to admit impostors.
(E) Anyone choosing an access-control system should base the choice solely on the ratio of false refusals to false admittances.
Bio access works by degrees of similarity, not identity (so say a 90% or above match will be allowed)
Even the same finger will rarely leave exactly identical prints (so 100% match will be rare)
We can adjust to minimize refusals of access to legitimate access-seekers (say 75% and above should be allowed) but such adjustments increase the likelihood of admitting impostors (now, it is more likely that an impostor will match because he has to match only 75% with someone).
The argument only talks about adjustment of reward (legitimate seeker allowed) vs risk (impostor coming in).
If you increase reward, risk increases.
(A) If a biometric access-control system were made to work by identity, it would not produce any correct admittance decisions.
We know 100% match is rare. But it is not impossible. So we cannot say that there would be no correct admittance.
(B) If a biometric access-control system reliably prevents impostors from being admitted, it will sometimes turn away legitimate access-seekers.
Correct. If bio access system is reliable in preventing impostors (it looks for a high degree of match say 98%), it will sometimes turn away legitimate seekers because same finger will not produce the same result every time. If there is no risk, there is likely to be low reward too. So all legitimate seekers may not be allowed every time.
(C) Biometric access-control systems are appropriate only in situations in which admittance of impostors is less of a problem than is mistaken refusal of access.
We don't know what to give more weightage - risk or reward - so we cannot say when bio access is appropriate. The argument only says that bio access balances risk and reward. Whether we find it appropriate in certain cases or not, the argument doesn't say.
(D) Nonbiometric access-control systems—based, for example, on numerical codes—are less likely than biometric ones to admit impostors.
Irrelevant. No discussion on non bio access.
(E) Anyone choosing an access-control system should base the choice solely on the ratio of false refusals to false admittances.
Irrelevant. The argument doesn't say how to choose an access system (bio or non bio)
Answer (B)
My doubt is, if the system will reliably prevent impostors from being admitted [I assume, it means ALL the time], to achieve this, we would have to use identity based approach rather than similarity based. This is so because, identity based approach is the ONLY way to make sure that an imposter is NEVER allowed in the restrictive area. But then, as a consequence, Genuine people will MOST OF THE TIMES [mostly] rejected, as the prints are same RARELY.
So, I would have accepted the options if it said, mostly insead of sometimes. And that's the reason I rejected this option.