Quote:
Juror anonymity was unknown to American common law and jurisprudence in the country?s first two centuries. Anonymity was first employed in federal prosecutions of organized crime in New York in the 1980's. Although anonymous juries are unusual since they are typically only empanelled in organized-crime cases, its use has spread more recently to widely publicized cases, such as the federal prosecution of police officers accused of beating Rodney King and the trial of those accused of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
In these cases, attorneys selected a jury from a panel of prospective jurors whose names, addresses, ethnic backgrounds and religious affiliations remained unknown to either side. This unorthodox procedure, designed to protect jurors from outside influence and the fear of retaliation, has occasionally been employed in New York federal courts since the trial of drug kingpin Leroy "Nicky" Barnes. Despite apparent benefits, critics assail anonymous juries on the grounds that they are an infringement of the sixth amendment guarantee of an impartial jury and because they present a serious and unnecessary erosion of the presumption of innocence.
Since many attorneys believe trials are frequently won or lost during jury selection, any procedure diminishing the role of counsel in the procedure necessitates close scrutiny and criticism. Opponents of anonymous juries argue that the procedure restricts meaningful voir dire, (questioning of the jury panel), and thereby undermines the defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. Critics also claim that jurors interpret their anonymity as proof of the defendant's criminal proclivity, thereby subverting the presumption of innocence.
However, consistent with due process and the sixth amendment, the trial judge may refuse to ask prospective jurors any questions not reasonably calculated to expose biases or prejudices relevant to the case. Although addresses and group affiliations may indicate significant potential for bias, attorneys do not have an unfettered right to this information in every circumstance. Denying access to these facts may indeed constrain an attorney's ability to assemble an ideal jury, but it violates no constitutional right.
1. The primary purpose of the passage is toThe passage explains what anonymous juries are and where they started, then lays out the main criticisms (they weaken the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury and the presumption of innocence). It ends by arguing that anonymity can still be constitutional because lawyers are not guaranteed access to every juror detail, and judges can limit questions to those that actually uncover relevant bias.
A. Enumerate reasons why anonymous juries are unconstitutional
This is not the main purpose. The passage mentions criticisms, but it ultimately rejects the claim that anonymous juries are unconstitutional.
B. Discuss whether anonymous juries are an infringement of the sixth amendment
This fits best. The passage is mainly about whether anonymous juries violate the sixth amendment, and it argues they do not necessarily do so, because the right is to an impartial jury, not to unlimited juror information. This is the
central question the passage addresses and answers.
C. Identify a shortcoming in a scholarly approach to jurisprudence
Not supported. There is no discussion of a scholarly approach to jurisprudence or any critique of scholarship.
D. Define the concept of anonymous juries and explore efforts taken over the last twenty years to increase their use
Too descriptive and incomplete. The passage does define anonymous juries and gives some history, but that serves as setup. The main point is the constitutional debate, not a survey of efforts to expand their use.
E. Review strategies for ensuring that anonymous juries will not infringe on the constitutional right to a fair trial of one?s peers
Too specific and a bit off target. The passage does not mainly “review strategies” for ensuring fairness; it mainly gives a legal argument for why anonymity can be consistent with due process and the sixth amendment, even if it limits counsel’s ideal jury selection.
Answer: (B)